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ABSTRACT 
THE (RAIL)ROAD NOT TRAVELED: 
THE FAILURE OF THE KRM COMMUTER RAIL PROPOSAL IN GREATER 
MILWAUKEE, WI 
  
by 
Neal A. Johnson 
 
University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee, 2014 
Under the Supervision of Dr. Linda M. McCarthy 
The Kenosha-Racine-Milwaukee commuter rail (KRM) proposal was one of many 
passenger rail proposals studied for the greater Milwaukee area over the past few 
decades. The proposed line would have connected the cities of Kenosha, Racine and 
Milwaukee, as well as communities in northern Illinois, along already existing rail lines. 
An analysis of archival information, newspaper coverage, and interviews with key 
stakeholders were conducted to explore the influence of an auto-dominated culture, the 
role of politics, local and regional expectations, funding issues, and the legacy of earlier 
local debates to determine why the KRM commuter rail proposal failed. In the beginning, 
the KRM proposal garnered overwhelming public and political support and was expected 
to drive economic development and regional transit cooperation. However, soon the tone 
changed and the KRM proposal was dead before it ever left the station. And while the 
failure of the KRM proposal can officially be blamed on conservative political leaders, a 
deeper analysis reveals that the KRM proposal's failure can be also be traced to the 
personal agendas of political leaders on both side of the aisle. This exploration into why 
the KRM commuter rail proposal failed will provide lessons learned for future 
Milwaukee proposals and new rail transit proposals throughout the country.  
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Introduction 
 Over the past few decades, passenger rail has been the focus of much attention in 
greater Milwaukee. Aiming to increase mobility for area residents, the greater Milwaukee 
area has seen numerous passenger rail initiatives introduced during this time. Perhaps 
most well-known is the East-West Corridor study from the 1990s that looked at the 
possibility of light rail for Milwaukee, which has now dwindled down to the current 
debate over a 1.9 mile streetcar line in downtown Milwaukee. Similarly, the State of 
Wisconsin started work on a proposed high speed rail line that would have connected 
Chicago and Minneapolis-St. Paul through Wisconsin’s two largest cities, Milwaukee and 
Madison. There have also been proposals for commuter rail projects such as the KRM 
commuter rail line from Kenosha to downtown Milwaukee. However, none of these 
proposals have yet to come to fruition.  
 Within this larger context of passenger rail, I specifically focus on the KRM 
commuter rail proposal. The case of KRM is an important study because while the 
service would have connected Milwaukee, Racine, and Kenosha as well as the Greater 
Chicago area, it could also be considered part of a larger regional rail system serving 
Southeast Wisconsin and Northeast Illinois. Thus it serves more than just the suburban 
commuter but the mobility needs of the entire region, connecting communities through an 
integrated regional system.  
 The term commuter rail refers to rush-hour services at the beginning and end of 
the day and is commonly seen as a preferred option for bringing suburban commuters 
into the central city (Cervero, 1998; Richmond, 2001). More broadly, commuter rail can 
also serve shoppers, students, and visitors, which is why it is also sometimes referred to 
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as regional rail (Grava, 2003). Commuter rail and regional rail both refer to passenger rail 
service that covers a large metropolitan area that is run by self-propelled locomotives, 
usually on existing rights-of-way.  
 This paper looks at the KRM commuter rail proposal to discern the reasons for its 
failure. It begins with background on the Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Planning 
Commission (SEWRPC) and the KRM proposal, followed by a review of the academic 
and public policy literature on passenger rail, research questions, and methodology. The 
findings of the paper are in five sections: automobile culture and the KRM; the politics of 
KRM; the expectations of KRM; funding issues for KRM; and KRM and the light rail 
debate. The paper closes with conclusions, lessons learned, and further research.  
Context and Background of Case Study 
The Role of the Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Planning Commission 
 In order to understand the debate about passenger rail in Wisconsin, an 
introduction to SEWRPC is necessary. What follows is a brief history and introductory 
background of SEWRPC, including how and why the commission was formed and the 
function it serves in transportation planning in southeast Wisconsin. 
 SEWRPC was formed on August 8, 1960 by then-governor Gaylord Nelson 
(Casey, 1998). SEWRPC covers seven counties in southeast Wisconsin: Kenosha, 
Walworth, Racine, Milwaukee, Waukesha, Ozaukee, and Washington. At formation, this 
area accounted for about 40% of the state's population but only 5% of its land (Hayes, 
2010). From the beginning, the issues of unplanned development and changing regional 
dynamics were apparent. As Hayes (2010, p.13) described: 
The transportation system of streets, roads and highways was hardly a system at 
all. Transportation planning was uncoordinated and piecemeal, based as much on 
3 
 
 
 
local political influence as on real needs of motorists. Thus, a major thoroughfare 
in Milwaukee might abruptly become a narrow city street as it passed a boundary 
into a suburb. 
Traffic, especially during rush-hours or winter weather, would often cause gridlock for 
entire neighborhoods. SEWRPC also dealt with other issues in the region, but much of its 
focus was on development that was sprawling faster than the infrastructure to support it.  
 The planning process was to be "nonpolitical" and "based on solid planning and 
engineering data" (Hayes, 2010, p 19). However, Casey (1998, p. 722) argued that the 
law that created SEWRPC was deficient due to the advisory nature of the commission 
and its lack of power to implement approved plans. When it came to transportation 
planning, Hayes (2010, p. 24) described the guidelines as follows: 
An individual highway or transit line cannot be planned in isolation. It must be 
recognized that the total urban transportation network acts as a system . . . 
Highway and transit systems must be planned together . . . The planning must be 
metropolitan or regional in scope . . . Transportation planning cannot be separated 
from land use planning. 
 Overall, SEWRPC was a commission formed to solve the pressing problems of 
unplanned development in the region, but was ineffective because it was simply an 
advisory board and not an implementing agency. It was still up to local governing bodies 
to implement the recommendations of the commission.   
KRM Background  
 The discussion about passenger rail linking Milwaukee, Racine, and Kenosha 
with Northern Illinois and the greater Chicago area has been a topic of debate for 
decades. A 1993 study looked at several possible routes, but mainly focused on a high-
speed rail connection between Chicago and Milwaukee (Envirodyne Engineers, Inc., 
1993). A 1998 study then gave rise to the idea of commuter rail connecting Milwaukee, 
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Racine and Kenosha through the existing Metra system which terminates in Kenosha 
(Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Planning Commission [SEWRPC], 1998).  
 Metra is a commuter rail system serving the seven county Chicagoland area 
(Metra, 2014). The system serves 241 stations, on nearly 490 route miles, and provides 
over 80 million passenger trips per year (Metra, 2012). The system is funded through 
ticket sales and a sales tax in the Illinois counties served (Metra, 2014). The original 
plans were to have Metra extend their current service to Racine and Milwaukee (Ryan, 
2005). However, because of Metra's establishment as an Illinois agency, it was unable to 
extend service to Milwaukee (Sandler, 2006). In fact, Metra service to Kenosha was paid 
for by the Union Pacific railroad because of the ease of turning around trains in the 
already existing facility. Thus the KRM proposal was a southeast Wisconsin issue, and a 
new agency would be needed to run it. The debate about the proposal continued, and in 
2010 the Southeast Regional Transit Authority (SERTA) again asked Metra officials to 
extend their current service from Kenosha to Milwaukee, but Metra was not interested in 
extending their service and was still limited as an agency of the state of Illinois (Sandler, 
2010a).  
 The Kenosha-Racine-Milwaukee commuter rail was a proposed 33 mile 
commuter rail system with nine stops planned (see map on following page) including 
major stops in Kenosha, Racine, and Milwaukee (Transit NOW, 2012) with an estimated 
annual ridership of 1.7 million (Institute for Survey & Policy Research, 2007). The 
system would have used existing freight railroad tracks with 14 weekday round trips 
planned (Transit NOW, 2012). Weekend service was also proposed at less frequent 
intervals. The service was to run on the Union Pacific line near the shore of Lake  
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Map of proposed KRM commuter rail route. 
 
Source: Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Planning Commission (SEWRPC). Retrieved from: 
http://maps.sewrpc.org/KRMonline/background.shtm 
Michigan through Racine and Kenosha. As a Racine Journal Times editorial described, 
"KRM would connect a corridor of highly populated areas in the southeastern corner of 
the state" (2011). This would place the KRM on a different line than the Amtrak 
Hiawatha service that runs from Milwaukee to Chicago on tracks closer to Interstate 94. 
The KRM line and Amtrak thus would have served different markets and different 
purposes; with KRM connecting areas between Milwaukee and Kenosha, and Amtrak's 
Hiawatha service as a quick connection between Milwaukee and Chicago. 
 A group of business leaders, elected officials, and pro-transit groups met in early 
2005 to discuss the advancement of the KRM proposal. As the non-profit transit group, 
Transit NOW (n.d.), put it: 
6 
 
 
 
 On February 25, 2005 the county executives and mayors of Kenosha, Racine, and 
 Milwaukee, and WisDOT joined in an act of true regional cooperation when they 
 sign[ed] an inter-governmental agreement (IGA) that will act as the management 
 structure for the next steps of the KRM commuter rail Metra extension project. 
In July of 2005 a bill was passed by the State Legislature and signed by then-Governor 
Jim Doyle establishing a temporary regional transit authority for Kenosha, Racine, and 
Milwaukee counties (SEWRPC, 2011a). In early 2006 this board of the newly formed 
Regional Transit Authority (RTA) was complete and consisted of one member from each 
of the three counties of Kenosha, Racine and Milwaukee, one member from the cities of 
Kenosha and Racine and two members from the City of Milwaukee (Transit NOW, n.d.). 
The legislature further legitimized the Southeast Regional Transit Authority (SERTA) in 
the 2009-2011 state budget when it was signed on June 29, 2009, giving them the 
authority to manage and fund the KRM (Transit NOW, n.d.).  
 By July of 2007 an alternatives analysis was completed with the help of SEWRPC 
that considered alternatives including buses only, and different combinations of both bus 
and rail (SEWRPC, 2011a). The conclusion of the KRM committee was that commuter 
rail was the preferred alternative. However, Rubin and Poole (2008) from the Reason 
Foundation argued that the alternatives were not given full consideration and further 
questioned the economic development forecasts.  
 Initially, KRM commuter rail "attracted broad support, without the level of 
opposition that has hampered light rail and electric bus proposals," according to Larry 
Sandler (2003) of the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel. This support came from all levels of 
government with Democratic Governor Jim Doyle making the formation of an RTA (a 
requirement for KRM to move forward) one of his policy priorities; Democratic 
Congressional Representative Gwen Moore was also supportive by fighting for the 
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provision of federal funding for the proposal; Republican Milwaukee County Executive 
Scott Walker was supportive of the concept of commuter rail, mainly because of the RTA 
concept; at the city level Democratic Racine Mayor John Dickert backed the proposal for 
its potential to help the struggling economy in the City of Racine, and Democratic 
Milwaukee Mayor Tom Barrett was supportive of the proposal and positive about the 
support from the business community. Further endorsement came from the transit 
advocacy group Transit NOW and SEWRPC who worked as staff to SERTA, the agency 
who was to fund and operate the commuter rail service. During the public input period in 
early 2003, over 1,200 people made favorable comments with only 20 comments 
showing opposition (Transit NOW, n.d.). As Transit NOW (n.d.) concluded, "The public 
input illustrated resounding support for KRM commuter rail. Those commenting reported 
a wide diversity of interest that is uncommonly rare in public projects."  
Literature Review 
 This section begins with a brief discussion of the literature related to commuter 
rail and passenger rail to provide context and then critically evaluates the literature which 
identifies a number of research questions that need to be asked. 
 The following attributes of commuter rail explain why it is often chosen as the 
way to promote regional transit mobility. First, in many cases commuter rail uses already 
established rail alignments and rights of way (Cervero, 1998), using existing resources to 
their maximum potential. Second, safety is considerably higher for commuter rail than 
automobile travel with a death rate of 0.06 and 0.91 per 100,000,000 passenger miles 
respectively (Grava, 2003). Third, commuter rail consumes less energy per passenger if 
the cars are mostly full. Last, commuter rail is often associated with increased land values 
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in surrounding areas (Cervero and Duncan, 2002) and the potential for transit-oriented 
development (Transportation Research Board, 2003).  
 In contrast, there are some reasons to exercise caution. First, flexibility is greatly 
reduced because as population shifts occur the tracks remain fixed in place (Grava, 
2003); this is a common criticism of any rail infrastructure. Second, there is also potential 
conflict with freight operations, which can slow down commuter service and increase 
expenses for infrastructure improvements. Third, local residents may be concerned about 
noise from train whistles or the trains themselves. Fourth, rail infrastructure has been 
deemed a costly expenditure that has no effect on traffic congestion on local roads or at 
job creation (Rubin et al., 1999). And last, despite the best efforts of planners to create 
higher-density living, rail transit does not substantially change the broader land use 
patterns in the United States (Rubin et al., 1999).  
 Despite the criticisms, in the past few decades regional rail projects throughout 
the United States have been gaining attention as a way to provide increased mobility in 
metropolitan regions. Middleton (2003) discussed a "metropolitan railways renaissance" 
occurring during the last two decades of the twentieth century in cities such as New York, 
Philadelphia, Chicago, Washington D.C., and Portland. Similarly, recent articles 
highlighted commuter rail projects in cities such as Fort Worth (Graham, 2013), Houston 
(Spieler, 2010), and Portland (Bergman et. al, 2011), and the expansion of already 
popular commuter rail service in Chicago (Bowen, 2008). These projects, especially in 
places known for freeway building such as Fort Worth and Houston, make it clear that 
the study of transit systems is important to understand how this shift in priorities is 
occurring and where it is occurring. 
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 What is missing in this discussion, however, is literature on the failure of 
proposed transit systems. While it is important to highlight the success of new regional or 
light rail systems and introduce newly proposed systems to the discussion, it is also 
crucial to understand why passenger rail systems were not completed. In seeking 
resources for this paper, I found minimal acknowledgements of passenger rail proposals 
that have failed. I was introduced to one Graduate thesis about the failure of the light rail 
proposal in Milwaukee (Lang, 2005). I also found periodical and trade publication 
acknowledgements of proposed rail systems that failed in Orlando (Peterson, 2009), the 
Netherlands (Railway Gazette International, 2013), New Mexico (Swartz, 2005), and 
Australia (Murray, 2010). Academic literature on the failure of passenger rail proposals is 
lacking and more research into this aspect of passenger rail, I argue, can help transit 
advocates and policy analysts to not only understand the importance of successful rail 
transit initiatives, but also learn lessons from the ones that failed despite each proposal 
having its own specific context. Studying the failure of passenger rail proposals 
specifically provides a more nuanced view of the factors leading to the demise of 
passenger rail proposals and can provide further insight into the factors that influence 
their failure.   
 Following this general overview of passenger rail, I now turn to a more critical 
review of the literature that will guide my research on the KRM commuter rail proposal. 
The literature is divided into five sections corresponding to the five important aspects of 
the literature on passenger rail: the impact of the automobile, the role of politics, the 
expectations of commuter rail, funding, and the legacy of earlier local debates.  
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1. The Impact of the Automobile 
 Automobile use in the United States has historically far outpaced that of the rest 
of the world. The United States was the first country to cross the threshold of mass 
motorization in 1958, at 400 vehicles per 1,000 people; nearly fifteen years before 
Canada, over twenty years before any European country, and almost thirty years before 
Japan (Jones, 2008). By 1980 the U.S. was also the first country to arrive at pervasive 
motorization when the combined share of commuting by walking and transit fell below 
10%, and the motorization level reached 685 vehicles per 1,000 people. This is an 
indication of a society so dominated by the automobile that the level of motorization has 
changed the scale of communities and the transportation options found in cities and 
metropolitan areas throughout the United States. As Interrante (1983, p. 100) argued 
"What began as a vehicle to freedom soon became a necessity."  
 After World War II, the massive consumption of automobiles and the exodus to 
the suburbs via new federally subsidized home loans signaled the downturn for rail in 
many parts of the United States (Alvord, 2000). The American people craved suburban 
spaces with single-family homes on large lots (Jackson, 1985; McShane, 1994). And as 
more Americans were able to finance single-family homes in the suburbs, they were also 
able to afford the costs of owning a personal automobile, making it the dominant 
transportation mode (Jones, 2008). An unintended consequence of this expansion was the 
increased necessity of the automobile due to the design and spatial arrangement of 
communities. Infrastructure to aid the mobility of those using the automobile, especially 
in urban areas, while initially from state or local funds, eventually came from the federal 
government most notably with the 1956 Interstate Highway Act (Jones, 2008). 
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 The pre-eminence of the automobile in United States transportation has been well 
documented (Alvord, 2000; Cervero, 1998; Goddard, 1996; Jackson, 1985, Jones, 2008; 
McShane, 1994; Perl, 2002; Richmond, 2001). Consequently, competition by the use of 
the automobile is a large hurdle to overcome when attracting ridership for mass transit 
(Cervero, 1998; Jones, 2008; Richmond, 2001). As Cameron (1997, p. 67) argued: 
In the long run, any reforms that break down the monopoly that the automobile 
has on mobility, and that increase the diversity of mobility options available, is 
desirable from an equity and an efficiency standpoint. By eliminating implicit 
subsidies to the car, efficiency policies have the potential to level the playing field 
whereby higher-occupancy modes can compete. These modes should not only 
cost less than the single-occupant car, but they should also result in reduced 
environmental harm, reduced congestion, and reduced need for costly road 
expansions that devastate human and wild habitats alike. 
 
 Cervero (1998, p. xi) contended that the explanation for the struggle of transit 
"lies in the fact that its chief competitor - the private automobile - is often grossly 
underpriced." He showed how large-scale metropolitan railways worked in wealthy 
Stockholm, Sweden and auto-centric Munich, Germany because of the differences in 
economic policies regarding the automobile. As Jackson (1985) argued United States 
governmental policies subsidized not only the building of highways, but also the 
expansion of growth into undeveloped land outside the city. As a result, the costs of 
owning and operating a personal automobile in the United States are extremely low in 
comparison to Europe and other places throughout the world (Jackson, 1985; 
Transportation Research Board, 2001). In Europe, higher taxes on fuel and ownership as 
well as restrictive parking policies discourage the private automobile for transportation, 
while encouraging the use of public transportation. The Transportation Research Board 
(2001, p. 118) also described how: 
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Throughout much of the post World War II period, the array of consumer choices 
available to Western Europeans was limited, not only because of public policies, 
but also because of economic conditions. Few Western Europeans had sufficient 
income to buy their own home, much less a single-family house on a large lot 
outside the city.  
 This brings into question the role of the federal government in transportation. 
While the U.S Department of Transportation (2005) argued that its focus is on 
"transportation issues of national significance" this broad statement does not clearly 
define the federal government's role in transportation. As the Bipartisan Policy Center 
(2011, p. 9) argued, "the federal surface transportation program has not had a focused 
purpose or defined objectives since the completion of the Interstate Highway System." 
And perhaps it is this ambiguity of new goals and the legacy of past objectives that has 
left transit in a subservient role to highways in the eyes of the federal government.  
 While this literature discusses the history of the automobile in the United States 
and explains the transportation reality in most of its metropolitan areas, it does not 
adequately explore the individual level transportation choices made by people in their 
everyday lives. Blainey et al. (2012) explore this phenomenon enumerating 37 barriers to 
choosing passenger rail over other modes of transportation. Now, despite the fact that this 
study took place in the United Kingdom and the fact that my study does not focus on 
individual transportation choices, this study is important to understanding the larger 
context of automobile dominance. Most pertinent to this discussion was their examination 
of car dependence. In the article they discussed two forms of car dependence; structural 
and conscious. Structural car dependence refers to the lack of transportation alternatives 
available to allow for a mode shift away from the personal automobile, while conscious 
car dependence is the result of personal habits and inaccurate perceptions of alternatives.   
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 The authors concluded that, despite all of the variables to mode choice, conscious 
car dependence was one of the factors of highest importance and most easy to change. 
However, what the author's do not discuss is unconscious car dependence where people 
do not even realize their intense level of dependence on the automobile, posing a large 
obstacle to the success of passenger rail and other modes. As such exploring the impact 
of the automobile on transit projects is important for understanding the larger cultural, 
structural, and governmental forces at play.  
2. The Role of Politics 
 Large cities in the United States have been losing population since 1960 due to 
suburbanization, changing the political power dynamics at the state level (Weir et al., 
2005). In many cases the political power previously held by a state's largest city quickly 
eroded as these cities lost as much as 15% of their 1960 population by 2000 (Weir et al., 
2005). This meant less political clout at the state level at a time when infrastructure needs 
began to increase, especially for transportation.   
 Weir et al. (2005) discussed the three traditional structures of governmental 
coalitions to explain the complex political relationships found in the United States: party-
imposed coalitions, issue-based coalitions, and governor-brokered coalitions.  These 
coalitions are crucially important to advancing transportation agendas. Party-imposed 
coalitions form when the leading constituency from the city (typically Democratic) 
merges with party allies at the state legislative level to push for the agenda of the city. 
This type of coalition works to advance a local transportation proposal within regional or 
state-wide transportation goals. Issue-based coalitions form around issues of mutual 
interest and attempt to garner regional cooperation to solve communal problems. This 
14 
 
 
 
type of coalition looks at larger regional transportation proposals, finding a way to solve 
problems at a broader level. Governor-brokered coalitions are typically very broad and 
complex constituencies with members from both sides of the aisle working together on 
larger issues. Here a governor merges divergent interests to fit into a larger transportation 
agenda.  
 Weir et al. (2005) see these distinct coalition groups as the basis for understanding 
how coalition building has typically worked in metropolitan America, but argued that 
these traditional forms of coalition building are often caught up in the larger issue of city 
versus suburbs. Thus the authors' introduced a new type of coalition, one that merges city 
and suburban interests as the solution to creating a regional agenda. While this may be 
the ideal way to move regional proposals (such as commuter rail) forward, the 
implementation of a regional political coalition is difficult at best. Whether these types of 
city-suburban coalitions will be able to emerge as the new model of governmental 
coalitions is questionable. 
 Throughout the 1960s and 70s coalitions of transit advocates found far-reaching 
support from a variety of areas including businesses and suburban commuters (Altshuler 
and Luberoff, 2003). Cities fought for "their share" of federal transit funds (O'Toole, 
2007, p. 196), citing transit lines not necessarily to ease the mobility of residents, but to 
fulfill political agendas (Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003). As Altshuler, a former 
Massachusetts secretary of transportation, argued "transit proved to be a policy for all 
perspectives on the urban problem. Though its direct constituency was relatively small, 
its ideological appeal proved to be extremely broad" (Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003, p. 
187). Powerful coalitions of transit advocates, developers and central city interest groups 
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used their political influence to push for rail projects (O'Toole, 2007). And while support 
from the downtown business sector and the political sector is important for the success of 
passenger rail (Levinson et al., 2012), this can be difficult in light of more contemporary 
assessments that describe transit proposals as politically divisive with support from 
Democrats but opposition from Republicans (Schwartz and Hawkins, 2013). 
  There is also the neoliberal shift in governance that has dominated since the late 
1970s (Harvey, 2007; Peck and Tickell, 2002; Theodore, Peck and Brenner, 2011). 
Neoliberalism tends to focus on privatization, open markets, reduced public sector 
presence, and less federal power, and is often seen as a response to the Keynesian 
policies of governmental intervention, regulation of the private sector, and federally-
funded public works programs that preceded it. In my assessment, the dominance of 
neoliberalism has constrained transit in the United States as public infrastructure 
investments have been devolved to the local level and the federal government embraces a 
more entrepreneurial approach. 
 Historian Owen Gutfreund (2004) suggested that the construction of highways in 
the United States was fueled by powerful highway lobbying groups that embedded the 
government bankroll of auto-centric planning into the core of American civilization. He 
traced these lobbying groups as far back as the late nineteenth century, and noted their 
increased influence in the passage of federal highway legislation in the early twentieth 
century. As Gutfreund argued, these groups established “the insertion of auto subsidies 
into the fabric of American political culture” (p. 32). Then the highway lobby gained an 
ally in the White House with the 1952 election of Dwight Eisenhower, and the Interstate 
Highway Act was passed in 1956 (Altshulter and Luberoff, 2003). Today the highway 
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lobby typically aligns with Republican leaders that continue to defend the implicit 
subsidizing of highways (Ross, 2006). 
 The Transportation Research Board (2001) suggested that regional governmental 
control of land use and transportation would help alleviate many of the issues facing the 
United States' metropolitan areas. In many cases individual municipalities are in charge 
of their own land use policies and transportation policy is often separated from land use 
and controlled by another local or regional authority.  
 The Portland, Oregon region serves as an example of an urban area where land 
use and transportation planning decisions are made at a regional level and coordinated 
into a broader plan (Transportation Research Board, 2001). This case suggests that when 
all of the stakeholders in the region join together to plan a coordinated land 
use/transportation plan, there are benefits for all involved. But politics often gets in the 
way of sound planning and cooperation, a product of the United States' politically 
fragmented governmental structure (Transportation Research Board, 2001). O'Toole 
(2007) argued that combining land use and transportation planning allowed for planners 
to manipulate land uses to serve their own agenda of getting people out of their cars. 
While I think this may have been the overall goal, O'Toole would have you believe this 
was a way to "socially engineer" (p. 196) Americans, instead of simply providing an 
alternative to an auto-centric lifestyle.  
 Overall, politics plays an important role in the fate of passenger rail. Regional 
political dynamics have now shifted power away from large cities as suburban districts 
put forth their own competing agendas. Governmental coalitions and regional 
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cooperation are very important to this discussion and provide a framework for 
understanding how these complex political relationships are formed. 
3. Local and Regional Expectations of Commuter Rail 
 Planners often tout the expected economic development potential in the vicinity 
of rail lines and at rail station locations. As the Transportation Research Board (2003, 17-
1) discussed, "transit-oriented development (TOD) generally refers to higher-density 
development, with pedestrian priority, located within easy walking distance of a major 
public transit station or stop(s)." These projects provide the potential for increased 
pedestrian activity seen as a way to curb urban sprawl and increase transit use 
(Transportation Research Board, 2003). This type of development conforms to designs 
often described as "new urbanism." Increased pedestrian activity, transit use, and denser 
development are some of the key tenets of the "new urbanist" movement. Similarly, the 
key objectives of transit-oriented developments are (Transportation Research Board, 
2003, p. 17-2):  
 To create places for people to live their daily lives through the use of transit and 
not the automobile. 
 To introduce new riders to transit, especially those who currently drive. 
 To build transit stations that serve as points of interest rather than park-and-rides. 
 To respond to the auto-oriented elements of other developments. 
 To emphasize environmental sustainability. 
 The type and amount of transit-oriented development that occurs can look very 
different, even on the same transit system. As the following examples from the 
Washington D.C. Metro system show, it is important to understand and work within the 
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local context when planning transit-oriented developments. In the example of the Wiehle 
Avenue station in Fairfax, VA some planners envisioned a "mini-city" rising from the 
station platform; however this type of development would be out of context with the 
surrounding land use patterns (Transportation Research Board, 2001). Others saw a more 
pedestrian friendly "town center" with upscale shops and inviting public spaces, 
something more in keeping with the local context. Whichever option was chosen, 
however, would still have to address the broader issue of land use patterns throughout the 
area to really have an impact on ridership.  
 The example of the Gallery Place station in historic downtown Washington D.C. 
showed how transit-oriented development has the potential to pay off with large increases 
in ridership and economic development (Transportation Research Board, 2003). Here the 
local central-city context can make it easier for ridership increases to happen since the 
development is part of a local land use pattern with increased density and pedestrian 
amenities. What is unknown in this scenario is if the increases in ridership would have 
come without the investments in transit-oriented development, something that is often 
questioned in these scenarios. The local conditions in suburban Fairfax, VA and in urban 
Washington D.C. are very different, so it is important that the local context be considered 
since the success of transit-oriented developments is also affected by surrounding land 
use patterns.  
 O'Toole (2009), a vocal critic of transit-oriented development, argued that rail 
transit, due to its inherit inflexibility, needed to create its own ridership; arguing that the 
fixed nature of rail does not allow for route flexibility to follow development and 
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ridership, so new development is needed near rail stations to spur ridership. He continued 
his argument by saying: 
 This leads transit agencies to promote intrusive land-use regulation that 
 discourages low-density development away from their rail lines and mandates 
 and/or subsidizes high-density developments close to rail stations (O'Toole, 2009, 
 p. 67). 
 
What O'Toole does not consider, however, is that new development not planned around 
transit is typically not amenable to buses or other forms of "flexible" transit, and that 
higher density development near rail stations may simply be a reflection of higher land 
values near the station because of rail, hence making low-density development an un-
economic use of the land.  
 Sometimes these developments do attract residents, businesses and increased 
ridership, but Cervero (2006) concluded that this was largely a reflection of a lifestyle 
preference for those choosing to locate there and not part of a larger shift in American 
priorities or preferences. Much of it comes down to personal preferences something that 
cannot be changed overnight.  
 A regional transit authority (RTA) is one of the most important elements of a 
broader approach to mobility. What follows are two examples of RTA's that formed in 
different time periods, under different funding mechanisms, and in different regional 
contexts, but each provides a deeper understanding of the expectation of RTA formation 
and the implications for regional transit cooperation. 
 The example of the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) is 
unique because of the time period in which it was formed and the issues it faced in the 
formation process (Golembiewsi & Kiepper, 1976). MARTA was originally conceived as 
an inter-governmental partnership between the five counties encompassing the Atlanta 
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metro area; Fulton, DeKalb, Cobb, Gwinnett, and Clayton (Bullard et al., 2000). When it 
was finally formed in 1971, Fulton and DeKalb counties were the only counties that 
passed the 1% tax referendum to fund MARTA, so the provision of service was revised 
(MARTA, 2004). The fact that only two counties were now part of the RTA is significant 
in that some observers may have seen this as a victory, while others may have seen it as a 
loss due to the surrounding counties choosing not to be part of the system. As 
Golembiewski and Kiepper (1976, 46) argued, MARTA had the expectation to build, 
operate and fund a mass transit system of rail lines and buses for the whole region. This 
may have been too much to expect from MARTA, as opposed to the Bay Area Rapid 
Transit (BART) in the San Francisco Bay Area that was only responsible for the regional 
rail components (Golembiewski & Kiepper, 1976).  
 The example of the South Florida Regional Transportation Authority (SFRTA) 
provides an example of regional transit cooperation that was accomplished by careful 
negotiations between the three counties of Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach 
(Alpert et al., 2006). In the case of south Florida, there were many provisions put into the 
legislation that helped to protect county-level financial autonomy and yet still form a 
regional transit structure. Counties were each required to put in a certain amount of 
money to fund the regional rail system and local funding mechanisms, such as the transit 
sales tax in Miami-Dade County, could go to local projects within the County instead of 
to the larger RTA. So the south Florida RTA makes an interesting case, because of its 
unique funding mechanisms that allow for local control of financial resources and 
separate funding for the RTA.  
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 While the cooperation of an entire metro region on transit may be the ultimate 
goal, these examples show that different approaches to a regional transit structure are 
possible. It may be too much to expect complete cooperation under one regional entity, so 
perhaps these examples can serve as a framework for regional cooperation where 
traditional approaches have not been successful. 
 The easiest way to understand the complex relationships involved in regional 
transit coordination is by using Ulberg's (cited in Meligrana, 1999) models of 
transportation governance. His levels of regional cooperation include: complete 
independence, informal coordination, formal coordination, partial integration, and full 
integration. However, this categorization is not rigid and many regions fall somewhere 
between categories. What this hierarchy shows is that while complete independence is 
not a regional approach and full integration may be the ultimate goal, there are varying 
degrees of coordination and integration of transit between these extremes that are specific 
to each region. Regional transit cooperation and integration is not a one size fits all 
concept, and must be looked at in respect to the local context. This hierarchy of 
coordination levels helps to contextualize the degree of coordination in a region and the 
resulting implications.     
 As I have shown, transit-oriented developments have the potential to bring 
increased economic development to station locations, but may only be a redistribution of 
investment in the region. These developments may bring increased ridership but again it 
may simply be a reflection of lifestyle choices for those that live or shop there. This leads 
me to questions about the expected benefits of economic development and transit-
oriented development and whether these expected benefits may be an unrealistic 
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expectation. Additionally, the prospects for the creation of an RTA are significant when it 
comes to large regional rail projects. In those areas without an existing regional transit 
authority, these larger rail projects bring this issue to the forefront of debates and the 
examples of MARTA and SFRTA show how these approaches can change over time and 
vary in scope. Ulberg's models of transportation governance provide a way to better 
understand the levels of transit coordination and how different regions and different 
RTA's fit into this hierarchy.  
4. Local, State and Federal Funding Issues 
 Transportation funding further complicates the issue of regional rail transit. In the 
United States federal and state funds make up a large percentage of the financing for 
transit projects. However, in most cases, some local financing is required. There are 
many ways in which this can occur such as fuel taxes, parking fees, motor vehicle 
registration fees, tolls, property taxes, and sales taxes (Institute of Public Administration, 
1979). Support for these additional fees can be mixed. Lowe (2013) discussed how the 
federal share for the financing of transit projects, while growing, has been outpaced by 
local funding sources. A September 2011 Railway Age article discussed how several 
passenger rail projects throughout the United States now depend on local revenue sources 
as cities are committing to passenger rail transit, despite needing to cover the costs 
themselves (Bowen, 2011). This move is evidence that cities (and regions) really do see 
the value of passenger rail for their communities. 
 This is indicative of the neoliberal shift in governance described earlier, devolving 
more financial responsibility for transit to the local level. Despite the provisions for 
flexible use of funding introduced in the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency 
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Act of 1991 (ISTEA), and subsequent authorizations, allowing states to use federal funds 
for highways or transit (Smart Growth America, 2014), the funds for highways cover as 
much as 80-90% of infrastructure costs while transit funds only cover about 50% of 
infrastructure costs (Pantell, 2009). This set-up not only subsidizes highway building but 
leaves state and local funds to cover a larger gap for transit projects. 
 Altshuler and Luberoff (2003) illustrate how transit funding has changed since the 
mid-twentieth century. Fares accounted for up to 91% of revenue in the 1950s and 
dropped to 25% by the 1990s, with state and local funding as low as 9% in the 1950s and 
peaking at 58% in the 1990s. As Altshuler (1979, p. 31) argued "throughout the 1950s, 
when the interstate highway program was getting underway, the conventional wisdom 
was that all transit costs, capital as well as operating, should be financed by users." 
Federal assistance for rail transit did come with the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 
1964, but after the 1980s federal money to maintain and operate transit systems fell 
dramatically, concentrating instead on capital for new projects (Alshuler and Luberoff, 
2003, p. 185-186). This meant that more local funding needed to be provided for the 
operation of transit, part of the devolution of neoliberalism leaving state and local 
authorities to pay for services previously funded at the federal level.  
 The Federal Transit Administration's (FTA) "New Starts" program is the current 
capital program for "fixed guideway" transit projects throughout the United States (Lowe, 
2013). However, the funding through this program is only available on a competitive 
basis, requires a local funding source to cover a percentage of the costs, and cannot be 
used to fund operations. So while it allows cities without already existing infrastructure to 
build passenger rail and other fixed guideway systems, it still has several limitations.   
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 The New Starts process consists of a series of stages which local agencies, such as 
transit system operators or regional planning commissions, must apply for on a 
competitive basis (Lowe, 2013). Once systems planning and alternatives analysis are 
completed, as part of the process, a project moves to preliminary engineering and final 
design. If these stages are successful the project goes into a pipeline where it is rated 
against other projects using criteria including cost versus benefit. Lowe (2013) also 
suggested that the stability of local financing can affect the decision to receive federal 
funds.  
 This literature shows how over the past 60 years transit funding has changed 
dramatically at the local, state and federal levels. Much of this responsibility has been 
devolved to the local level as federal commitment to transit has largely shifted to capital 
for construction of new projects and not for the operation of transit systems.  
5. The Legacy of Earlier Local Debates  
 Passenger rail initiatives in the Milwaukee area have a long history of ideological 
polarization (Casey, 1995; Hayes, 2010; Johnson, 2014; Lang, 2005). As Hayes (2010, p. 
171) argued, "No single issue in Southeastern Wisconsin . . . revealed regional divisions 
more than transit." Casey (1995) traced the beginnings of these feuds in southeast 
Wisconsin to the freeway-building era of the 1960s with then-Milwaukee mayor Henry 
Maier coming out against freeways while surrounding counties supported freeway 
building for ease of mobility. This sentiment is similar to what I found in my own study 
into the light rail debate of the 1990s with then-Milwaukee Mayor John Norquist being 
anti-freeway and pro-light rail, while the surrounding counties wanted expanded 
freeways but opposed the provision of light rail (Johnson, 2014).  
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 During the light rail debate these divisions became more than just regional; they 
were now politically partisan, pitting conservatives against liberals in a debate that was 
hardly ever in the interest of mobility for the citizens of southeast Wisconsin (Hayes, 
2010; Lang, 2005). According to Hayes (2010), political divisiveness took on a more 
prominent role in 2002 when Republican Scott Walker, then a member of the state 
assembly, ran for Milwaukee County Executive as a staunch opponent to any form of rail 
transit. 
 Planners and transit advocates started to explore the use of light rail in Milwaukee 
in the 1980s, but these proposals never got very far (Lang, 2005). The issue of light rail 
was revived when the Federal Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) 
was signed into law in 1991 (Johnson 2014). As part of the bill, states would receive 
Interstate Cost Estimate (ICE) funds from the federal government to complete sections of 
interstate highway, but the money could also be diverted to other modes such as transit 
and bike infrastructure. Wisconsin received $241 million in ICE funds, thrusting the 
debate over light rail back on the table. The political scuffle over light rail in Milwaukee 
would continue until 1999 when a compromise was reached whereby light rail was 
scrapped from the plans and the money diverted to highway and bridge projects, plus a 
small rail transit project in the City of Milwaukee which would get $91.5 million of the 
federal funds. This compromise at the end of the debate set a precedent for the 
transportation priorities in southeast Wisconsin. The Milwaukee transit project would be 
fought over for another decade to come (Hayes, 2010; Johnson, 2014). In 2009, 
Congress, through a measure included in President Obama's first budget bill, split the 
money with 60% going to the City of Milwaukee for their streetcar project and 40% 
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going to Milwaukee County for express bus routes on the Milwaukee County Transit 
System (MCTS) (Hayes, 2010). 
 As the preceding literature shows, the politics of passenger rail transit in southeast 
Wisconsin has been ideologically divisive. The legacy of the regional and political 
scuffles over transportation options and priorities continues to plague southeast 
Wisconsin as the mobility of area residents is determined by the power of political 
figures, and not the transportation needs of the people. 
Research Questions 
 The preceding literature review raises the following questions about why the 
KRM proposal failed which will guide my research, specifically: 
1. What was the influence of the automobile?  
 What was the impact of an auto-dominated culture on the proposal? 
2. What was the role of politics?  
 How did politics influence the failure of the KRM proposal? 
 Was coalition-building part of the KRM proposal? 
 What were the obstacles to regional cooperation in the case of KRM? 
3. What were the expectations of KRM and were they too high?  
 What could KRM's potential impact have been on Milwaukee, Racine and 
Kenosha in terms of economic development, transit-oriented development, 
and regional transit cooperation? 
4. How was the issue of funding addressed?  
 What were the potential sources of funding especially at federal and local 
levels? 
 How much of KRM's expenses would be covered by fares and what would 
this mean for local funding? 
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 What was the discourse on funding? 
 Were funding issues responsible for the failure of the KRM proposal? 
5. What was the impact of the previous light-rail debate on the KRM?  
 How did the legacy of regional disagreements over transportation affect 
the KRM? 
Methodology 
 The research uses a variety of primary and secondary sources. These sources 
include print publications and the online archives of the Southeastern Wisconsin 
Regional Planning Commission (SEWRPC), and information from Transit NOW's 
website, a local public transit advocacy organization. In addition, I analyzed newspaper 
coverage of the issue in local and regional publications such as the Milwaukee Journal 
Sentinel, Daily Reporter, Racine Journal Times and Biz Times Milwaukee. Finally, three 
in-person interviews were conducted with key stakeholders intimately involved in the 
KRM commuter rail proposal.  
 My first interview was with a public policy analyst that has researched and 
written about transportation issues in Milwaukee as well as other cities in the United 
States. My second interview was with a transportation planner that was involved in the 
KRM proposal. My third interview was with a transit advocate that worked on the 
promotion of the KRM.  
 All interviews were conducted in a private, one-on-one format and were recorded 
and transcribed. The interview questions (see Appendix B) were specifically formulated 
to elicit answers to the five research questions from each of the interviewees. All of the 
interviews were semi-structured to allow the interviewee to expand upon issues they felt 
were important, however, each interviewee was asked the same questions. Interviewee 
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information has been kept confidential so generic job titles were assigned solely as a way 
to distinguish them. 
 All of the newspaper, website, and archival data was analyzed by hand and 
categorized based on answering one of the research questions:  
1. What was the influence of the automobile?  
2. What was the role of politics?  
3. What were the expectations of KRM and were they too high?  
4. How was the issue of funding addressed?  
5. What was the impact of the previous light-rail debate on the KRM?  
All of the content relating to each research question was then transcribed into a separate 
document and subdivided into sections of related content. These subsections were 
determined after an analysis of the content to find the key factors that relate to answering 
each research question based on the number of sources discussing similar ideas, how the 
content ties-in with the literature, and how it helped to answer that specific research 
question.  
 Interview data was analyzed and categorized in the same manner, but separate 
from the other content. A more integrated approach to analyzing all of the content 
together was not used in this case because interviews were conducted after the initial 
analysis of newspaper, website, and archival data which allowed for the literature and 
other data to guide the interviews. The three interview transcripts were analyzed for 
content related to the subsections of content described above using the same criteria. The 
interview analysis was used to substantiate and provide deeper understanding of the other 
sources, while also providing new insights. The comprehensive analysis that follows 
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incorporates all content, subdivided by the key factors found throughout the analysis that 
provide an answer to each research question.  
Findings and Analysis 
1. Automobile Culture and the KRM 
 This section addresses the question of what the impact of an auto-dominated 
culture was on the failure of the KRM proposal. My analysis found that the impact of an 
auto-dominated culture on the failure of the KRM proposal can be traced to three 
important factors: the integrated nature of the automobile into the southeastern Wisconsin 
culture and economy, the level of highway congestion found in the region, and the 
inherent bias in favor of highways over transit.  
 The "mass motorization" and "pervasive motorization" of the United States along 
with increased suburbanization in the post-World War II period, discussed previously, are 
key macro-level forces influencing automobile proliferation throughout the United States. 
However, at the micro-level the impact of the automobile in southeastern Wisconsin can 
also be attributed to the area being a dominant hub of auto-related manufacturing during 
the American industrial age. The area was home to important auto manufactures like 
American Motors and Nash Motors, and auto-related businesses like AC Spark Plug and 
Johnson Controls (Hayes, 2010, p. 80). In addition to these are related industries like 
Mercury Marine, Briggs and Stratton, Harley-Davidson, and manufacturers of other 
motorized equipment like Allis Chalmers and J.I. Case (Hayes, 2010, p. 80). This large 
presence of manufacturing devoted to the internal combustion engine made the 
automobile an integrated part of the culture and economy of the region. 
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 The KRM proposal was planned within the context of this automobile culture, one 
consequence of which were the obstacles to attracting ridership when compared to the 
flexibility of the automobile. Planners and SEWRPC knew that for KRM commuter rail 
to be a viable alternative to the automobile, travel times had to be competitive (SEWRPC, 
2011b). The KRM proposal estimates showed travel times equal to or better than those of 
driving (Transit NOW, 2012). The transportation planner interviewed during my research 
acknowledged that the vast majority of people in southeast Wisconsin drive to work or 
other destinations and attributed this to the lack of alternatives available here, leaving 
many people without a choice. This highlights the structural car dependence, as 
introduced by Blainey et al. (2012), seen in southeast Wisconsin where many people 
depend on their cars due to structural transportation barriers. In addition, the 
aforementioned transportation planner discussed the debates about transit service within 
the region; indicating that some people said public transit options were not available 
because there was no demand for them, while others said that if there were better 
alternatives to the automobile the demand would follow. 
 As Rosemary Potter, executive director of Transit NOW discussed, the key is to 
get people into the habit of using commuter rail, such as during the forecasted 
reconstruction of Interstate 94 (Grundle, 2006). This is connected to the idea of conscious 
car dependence as described earlier by Blainey et al. (2012), where people are 
consciously (but habitually) attached to the automobile and the key to sparking change is 
to change people's habits during construction or other major events. Along with this 
notion of conscious car dependence, I argue that there is also a dimension of unconscious 
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car dependence, especially here in southeast Wisconsin, where people are completely 
unaware of their dependence on the automobile.  
 The automobile culture in southeast Wisconsin seems to also be influenced by the 
lack of appreciation for transit. As discussed in my interview with the transit advocate, 
there really isn't a broad understanding of what transit (more specifically rail transit) can 
do for a region largely because the people of southeast Wisconsin don't travel to the great 
transit cities of the country (or the world) and therefore don't appreciate it. This speaks to 
how the culture of the region has influenced the transportation options available. 
 There are differing opinions about the congestion levels in southeast Wisconsin, 
which may come down to an issue of relativity. Transit NOW argued that the study area 
suffers from traffic congestion and delays that have cost residents and businesses over 
$400 million and that the implementation of KRM commuter rail could reduce 
congestion and overall traffic volumes in the area (Transit NOW, 2012). However, the 
public policy analyst I interviewed saw the levels of congestion in Milwaukee as low 
enough that many people do not see a need for alternatives to the automobile. The 
transportation planner provided yet another opinion indicating that congestion in 
southeast Wisconsin is comparable to other cities of similar size, noting that it is 
important to keep in mind the amount of congestion compared to the size of the city.    
 Transit NOW's argument about the high level of congestion is evidence of the 
automobile culture in the area with the discourse surrounding the proposal tailored to 
automobile owners. Even though congestion levels may not be as high as in other cities, 
this argument gave drivers, especially those that are consciously or unconsciously car 
32 
 
 
 
dependent, a reason to support KRM. However, there is no evidence that these arguments 
about KRM reducing congestion in the region resonated with the people.  
 An analysis of the numbers reveals an inherit bias towards the automobile and 
highways in Wisconsin transportation planning. An estimated $1.9 billion is going 
towards the rebuilding and widening of Interstate 94 between the Wisconsin/Illinois 
border and Milwaukee, while the KRM commuter rail would have cost $230 million for 
construction, 12% of the cost of the freeway (Sandler, 2007). While the need for the 
reconstruction of the aging highway should not be minimalized, the additional costs of 
expansion could have arguably gone to the KRM proposal which could have diverted 
people to the use of commuter rail over driving. As Ward Lyles of the Milwaukee Journal 
Sentinel said of then-Milwaukee County Executive Scott Walker, "Walker's vision for the 
future is clear: cars and cars only, never mind the costs" (Lyles, 2007).  
 Even with the flexibility of federal funding, described earlier, which could go to 
transit instead of highways, there is still an implicit subsidy to highway projects that 
receive a larger percentage of their funding from federal funds, leaving many states, like 
Wisconsin, to prioritize highways over transit. Additionally, there is an ambiguity of the 
federal role in transportation; where past objectives, such as the Interstate Highway 
System, mean the prioritization of highways to serve mobility needs to the neglect of 
transit infrastructure.   
 As the following opinion piece from the February 9, 2007 Milwaukee Journal 
Sentinel on the KRM proposal shows, local residents were also frustrated with this issue: 
Even though it may not serve everyone directly, it will serve everyone indirectly 
by taking hundreds of cars off the roads. In the 1950s, the car and oil companies, 
along with their friends in the U.S. government, conspired to build our U.S. 
Interstate Highway System, encouraging the massive use of new cars and use of 
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fuel to power them . . . closed down many public transportation companies, giving 
our citizens no choice but to buy and run their new cars on these new 
superhighways. The state of Wisconsin and federal government are now planning 
to widen sections of I-94 between Milwaukee and Chicago to accommodate 
hundreds of additional cars over time (Myers, 2007). 
This critique of car manufacturers, oil companies, and the government in the proliferation 
of the automobile in the United States and southeast Wisconsin shows the extent to which 
this inherit bias towards highways over transit has affected southeast Wisconsin culture. 
While the use of the word "conspired" might be a bit strong, it is hard to refute the 
influence of the Interstate Highway System on the demise of transit that has left many 
American's with little choice but to own and operate a private automobile.  
 As my analysis has shown, the evidence for an auto-dominated culture in 
southeastern Wisconsin is clear. The automobile is an integrated part of the southeastern 
Wisconsin culture and economy; this can be seen in the concentration of automobile-
related industries, the way the proposal was planned and disseminated to the public, the 
car dependency of the public, and a lack of appreciation and understanding for what 
transit can mean to a community. The levels of traffic congestion in the region seem to be 
different depending on whom you ask; while traffic congestion was used as a selling tool 
by some, this argument did not resonate with the people and left many wondering if the 
service was necessary. The inherit bias towards highways over transit is easily seen in the 
numbers, something local officials never seemed to question but a fact that upset some 
residents.  
 Despite the influence of the automobile on the KRM proposal and the evidence 
for an auto-dominated culture in southeast Wisconsin, my analysis revealed that other 
factors were in fact more influential in the demise of the KRM proposal. As further 
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analysis will reveal, the proposal was still able to move forward and might have even 
happened despite the influence of an auto-dominated culture. 
2. Politics of KRM 
 My analysis revealed that the role of politics in the failure of the KRM proposal 
can be traced to five key factors: a change in general political tone and support, the 
formation of SERTA, the lack of support from Milwaukee leaders, the 2010 Governor's 
race, and the decisions of three key political figures.   
  The political tone was positive in early 2005 after the formation of an 
"intergovernmental partnership" to begin studying the KRM commuter rail proposal 
(Ryan, 2005; SEWRPC, 2011a). However, the debate would soon turn contentious as 
described in this March 22, 2007 Milwaukee Journal Sentinel article: 
It's time to end the Milwaukee transportation wars . . . The dispute over funding to 
modernize southeastern Wisconsin's aging transportation system seems likely to 
surpass the Hatfield-McCoy feud in intensity and longevity . . . It seems as if 
present-day partisans have inherited their positions rather than truly understanding 
why they are fighting. The current clash over transportation spending has more do 
to with the personal agendas of politicians than the culture wars between suburban 
and urban lifestyles that started the feud. Unfortunately, as long as transit 
improvements are held hostage in that war, the region's businesses and residents 
will suffer greatly (Lyles, 2007).  
This account shows that the lines had been drawn in a political war on transit in southeast 
Wisconsin, with debates now focused more on ideologies and less on the particular issues 
surrounding transit. 
 Along with this shift in political tone, was a shift in the support of political leaders 
on both sides of the aisle. While all of my interviewees discussed how early on in the 
debate over KRM there was actually a great deal of Republican support (or at least not 
staunch opposition) that eventually changed to opposition, my analysis also revealed a 
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change in support by Democratic leaders. Four political figures that I will expand upon 
later in this analysis, two Democrats and two Republicans, changed or altered their stance 
on the KRM proposal. Democrats Tom Barrett and Gwen Moore, while in support of the 
proposal in the beginning had changed their stance as concerns over funding became 
apparent. Republicans Scott Walker and Robin Vos, while vocal opponents of the 
proposal in the end, they were not always opposed to the proposal. For reasons that will 
be revealed throughout this analysis, these political leaders changed their position on, and 
subsequently the trajectory of, the KRM proposal.  
 I saw evidence of this shift in political support as far back as 2004 when it became 
clear that funding for the operations of the project would not be coming from the State of 
Wisconsin, but from local sources (Sandler, 2004). As a 2006 Milwaukee Journal 
Sentinel article showed, when it came to approval of local funding there was a great deal 
of support for the KRM in principle but not in practice (Resler, 2006). Then in early 2007 
the University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee released an economic impact study of the KRM 
proposal that boasted of job creation, expanded tourism, increased property values, and 
increased economic development that would come from the KRM (Institute for Survey & 
Policy Research, 2007). However, Rubin and Poole (2008) of the Reason Foundation, a 
conservative research organization, refuted the findings of this study citing its unrealistic 
assessment of the economic impact of KRM, while also attacking the "alternatives 
analysis" performed by SERTA (a full analysis of this debate to follow in the next 
section). Then came the economic crisis of 2008 where fiscal austerity policies became 
the new imperative. As the transportation planner I interviewed indicated while there was 
bipartisan support for the KRM proposal at the beginning, a political shift occurred in the 
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wake of the 2008 financial crisis that changed the political tone. In late 2009 Republican 
candidate for Governor Mark Neumann came out against the KRM citing the lack of 
evidence showing the proposed line as being economically viable (Forster, 2009). This 
would be followed in early 2010 with similar declarations by fellow Republican 
candidates Robin Vos (2010) and Scott Walker (Sandler, 2010d). At the same time, 
Randal O'Toole of the Cato Institute, another conservative research group, came to speak 
at a Racine Tea Party event in opposition of rail and KRM (Ryan, 2010a & 2010d). So 
while the shift in political tone and support by politicians can be traced back as far as 
2004 when funding became an issue, it seems that the decisive shift came in the wake of 
the 2008 financial crisis where a combination of fiscally conservative policies and project 
scrutiny brought on by conservative groups shifted the political tone of the proposal. 
 The formation of SERTA was also very important to the discussion of politics. 
According to the transit advocate I interviewed, initially planners and other stakeholders 
in the planning process, knowing the opposition of the western half of Racine County, 
proposed to carve this section of the county out from under the umbrella of SERTA. The 
RTA proposed would include all of Milwaukee and Kenosha Counties but only the 
eastern half of Racine County. This warrants a brief discussion of two key components of 
Racine County's political structure that influenced the trajectory of SERTA and KRM.  
 First of all, there was political (and lifestyle) polarization separating the two 
halves of Racine County. The transit advocate I interviewed described an east-west 
divide in Racine County, with rural western Racine County being very conservative, and 
the more urban and suburban eastern Racine County, including the City of Racine, as 
being more liberal, Interstate 94 basically divided the two sections of the county in half. 
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Western Racine County was not in support of the KRM proposal or any tax increases to 
fund it (or the RTA more broadly), while eastern Racine County and the City of Racine 
itself were counting on KRM to revitalize the local economy. Racine Mayor John 
Dickert, a supporter of KRM, feared that "a political scuffle over buses will be the 
undoing of the KRM" and would hinder the ability of Racine to attract new jobs and 
development (Ryan, 2009c). 
 Second, because of the structure of the Racine County Board, the City of Racine 
actually has very little power, so the western portions of the county could dictate what 
happened in the rest of the county. This was something confirmed by Robin Vos in a 
video recording of a Tea Party event in Racine where he stated that, "we are fortunate 
that in Racine County we have a County Executive and County Board that is controlled 
by conservatives, and we should be very proud of that" (Ryan, 2010d). As I will elaborate 
on later, this would prove to be significant for KRM. This structure of government refers 
to Weir et al.’s (2005) discussion of shifting political dynamics that means less power for 
cities and urban areas as suburban and rural voting blocs become more influential.  
 As described by the transit advocate I interviewed, the move to carve out western 
Racine County from the RTA upset some Milwaukee County supervisors who argued 
that western Racine County had to pay their fair share. They wanted this area included, 
even though studies showed that less than 25% of the revenue for KRM in Racine County 
would come from the western section of the county, since it was largely rural. My 
interviewee recalled telling the Milwaukee County supervisors not to fight this, because it 
would end up killing the proposal.  
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 The decision to include western Racine County was important to the failure of the 
KRM proposal because local Racine County officials, most notably Robin Vos, 
eventually became the biggest opponents of the KRM that was forced upon them by 
Milwaukee County bureaucrats. The public policy analyst I interviewed substantiated this 
by describing how conservative citizen groups and legislators in the Racine area started 
to label the proposal as a "boondoggle." As a result, the KRM and the RTA would have 
new opposition to contend with. Consequently, this political move by Milwaukee County 
leaders became a key event in the failure of the KRM proposal; I also argue that it is 
possible that the proposal would have moved along with less opposition had Milwaukee 
County leaders not fought for the inclusion of western Racine County, perhaps resulting 
in a different outcome. 
 Now we turn to a discussion of local Milwaukee leaders, and their role in the 
failure of the KRM proposal. My analysis shows that support for KRM in Milwaukee 
County, a typically Democratic stronghold, was mixed. In 2004 Democratic Mayor Tom 
Barrett said he supported the commuter rail plan and was "encouraged that this is a 
project that business leaders want to see happen" (Sandler, 2004). However, by 2010 the 
Mayor voiced reservations about KRM (Sandler, 2010e). While he was in support of a 
downtown streetcar system, his support for rail transit did not necessarily extend to the 
KRM proposal. He had concerns about the funding of the proposal as well as the 
coordination with Metra to allow transfers to their system in Kenosha. Mayor Barrett 
simply said "I'm not going to commit to it" (Sandler, 2010e).   
 Democratic Representative Gwen Moore showed support for the KRM in her 
effort to secure federal funding for the proposal in 2005 (Ryan, 2005). In 2010 however, 
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Moore spoke out against KRM, not because she didn't support the proposal, but because 
she felt the funding issue that faced MCTS needed to be addressed first, before KRM 
continued any further (Sandler, 2010f). Moore had proposed to put KRM on hold for one 
year until local bus funding was agreed upon, but her proposal did not garner enough 
support to pass (Sandler, 2010f). Moore's argument for putting buses first, seems largely 
to come from her need to appeal to her Milwaukee constituents who rely on the bus for 
their daily needs; especially since local elections were barely two months away.  
However, she still showed support for KRM which would have had four stops in her 
congressional district.  
 Milwaukee County Supervisor Michael Mayo, and Milwaukee County Board 
Chairman Lee Holloway were also opposed to the proposal, and went so far as to ask the 
Federal Transit Administration (FTA) to deny the RTA's funding application for 
preliminary engineering (Ryan, 2010c). Their opposition was mainly because of the 
funding crisis MCTS was facing, an issue they would have to deal with themselves at 
some point.  
 The issue over MCTS funding was also noted by the public policy analyst I 
interviewed who discussed how the Milwaukee County Board was very concerned that 
KRM was going to divert resources away from MCTS. The county was struggling just to 
keep buses afloat and maintain a decent level of service, leaving many to question why 
KRM should even be built if current bus transit systems are struggling for funds. These 
reservations indicate how important the KRM was not only for mobility, but for the 
creation of an RTA that could provide a dedicated source of funding. The public policy 
analyst also emphasized that traditionally Democratic constituencies in Milwaukee were 
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not out there fighting for KRM. So while conservatives and anti-rail groups formed a 
strong coalition against KRM, there was not a coherent voice on the other side 
advocating for the proposal.  
 This leads back to our earlier discussion of governmental coalitions. Unlike the 
broad coalitions of transit advocates, developers and business interests, as discussed by 
Althshuler and Luberoff (2003) that would fight for these proposals; KRM never had a 
broad enough support base to form this type of coalition. Furthermore, the Republicans of 
southeast Wisconsin were able to form a party-imposed coalition, as described by Weir et 
al. (2005). With Milwaukee's suburban communities aligning with other Republicans at 
the state level to fight off costly rail transit proposals, Democrats were not able to broker 
similar coalitions to advance KRM. And while Gov. Doyle was able to form a governor-
brokered coalition to fit KRM and the creation of an RTA in his agenda, his desire for a 
regional solution, which would have been similar to Weir et al.'s (2005) city-suburban 
coalition, may have ended up killing the proposal.  
 The 2010 governor's race showcased the politics of rail in Wisconsin. As Larry 
Sandler (2010e) of the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel described:  
Railroads and politics have one thing in common: They're all about the timing. 
Trains run by schedules. Politicians wait for the right moment to make their 
moves. Political circumstances have brought three different rail transit plans to the 
forefront simultaneously - only to thrust them into an election-year controversy 
where some plans may not survive. Politically, all three are linked in the minds of 
their opponents, as symbols of unnecessary taxation and skewed transportation 
spending priorities. The train debate in recent years has turned partisan, pitting 
Democratic rail backers against GOP critics, now the rail projects have emerged 
as an issue in the fall governor's race.  
Here, Sandler refers to the convergence of three major passenger rail proposals in 
Wisconsin at the time; the downtown Milwaukee streetcar, the high speed rail running 
from Chicago to Minneapolis-St. Paul, and the KRM commuter rail. The fact is that the 
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details of each proposal didn't matter; rail was now a party-line issue and one that would 
be at the forefront of the race for Wisconsin Governor. 
 Republican candidates for Governor, former U.S. Representative Mark Neumann 
(Forster, 2009), Milwaukee County Executive Scott Walker (Sandler, 2010d), and state 
Representative Robin Vos (Vos, 2010) were all revving up their bids to clinch the 
Republican nomination and used their opposition to rail as a political tool to secure votes. 
Also, as discussed earlier, Republican constituencies typically align with highway 
lobbying groups that are highly influential especially during important elections such as 
this. So it is possible that highway lobby interests were also guiding this anti-rail 
discourse. Based on my analysis, by this time it was simply too late for KRM to survive. 
As the public policy analyst I interviewed described, "KRM was still on life support" at 
this time, and seemed doomed to fail. 
 Finally, we turn to a discussion of three key political figures and their role in the 
failure of the KRM proposal. These key actors are: then Milwaukee County Executive 
Scott Walker (who eventually became Governor), Republican State Representative Robin 
Vos (who eventually became Assembly Speaker), and then Democratic Governor Jim 
Doyle.  
 As described by the public policy analyst I interviewed, then-Milwaukee County 
Executive Scott Walker was initially supportive of the idea of commuter rail as an 
alternative to light rail, but his support only went so far. In a SERTA board meeting in 
2007, the committee agreed upon funding the RTA with a 0.5% sales tax. This was tabled 
at the next meeting when Scott Walker (along with Racine County Executive Bill 
McReynolds) opposed the sales tax increase (Ryan, 2007b). Then in May of 2010, as 
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Walker was revving up his bid for governor, he officially came out against the KRM 
commuter rail proposal (Sandler, 2010d). While always being opposed to any sales tax 
increase to pay for KRM, he was not a vocal opponent of the proposal. His statement in 
opposition specifically refers to the shift in politics described in my interviews and 
captured in my analysis. As SERTA vice chairman, Julia Taylor told Larry Sandler of the 
Journal Sentinel "over the years, Scott has expressed support for the concept of commuter 
rail. I'm disappointed that he is changing his position" (Sandler, 2010d). The transit 
advocate I interviewed remarked on how Scott Walker took on the high-speed rail issue 
as a campaign issue, leaving many Wisconsinites to confuse KRM with high-speed rail 
and buy into the political discourse of rail as a costly tax-burden for Wisconsin. 
 As mentioned previously, one of the most vocal opponents of the KRM commuter 
rail was Republican State Representative Robin Vos of Racine County. However 
initially, Vos was not adamantly opposed to KRM, just how it was to be funded (Burke, 
2007a). He showed support by asking that the KRM be brought to a referendum vote and 
to let the people decide its fate. But this may have just been a veil hiding his true 
opposition to the KRM, seen in his voting pattern on issues surrounding the proposal and 
his failure to align with the Racine business community that was strongly in favor of 
KRM (Burke, 2007a). Then in an editorial in the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel in April 10, 
2010, Vos came out as being decidedly opposed to the KRM and argued that 
transportation in southeast Wisconsin was about priorities and that KRM would drain 
scarce resources when the priority should be fixing the roads and buses that are already in 
trouble (Vos, 2010). Vos also blamed SERTA for not keeping buses a priority and only 
worrying about funding for the failing bus systems after KRM's future depended on a 
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stabilized bus system. But as my analysis revealed, SERTA officials were just as 
concerned about funding the struggling bus systems in the region as they were a 
commuter rail line. 
 As the transit advocate I spoke with revealed, Robin Vos also linked himself with 
other Racine County conservatives such as Fred Young, a former Racine businessman to 
fight the KRM proposal. Fred Young was on the board of the Cato Institute and the 
Reason Foundation, two groups that vocally opposed rail proposals throughout the United 
States. They formed a coalition to stop the KRM proposal in its tracks. This was the 
beginning of what one might call the anti-transit coalition that fought to stop the KRM 
proposal. In one instance, a rail transit opponent named Randall O'Toole from the Cato 
Institute was brought in to speak at a Tea Party event in Racine. In a video recording of 
this event, Vos made it clear that he was fine with bringing the issue to referendum 
because he knew it would not pass and was depending on his Racine County Republican 
supporters to make sure the KRM proposal failed (Ryan, 2010d). My interviewee 
described how this team of opponents would go around and distort the facts about KRM 
and the RTA, something for which people behind the initiative were not prepared. These 
proponents were caught off-guard by the opposition that emerged in 2009 and 2010. The 
push-back continued with national conservative organizations such as the Americans for 
Prosperity, throwing money and resources into local elections; transit and KRM were 
used to wedge the voting public and help the Republicans gain the majority in the state 
legislature and fill the Governor's mansion.  
 In 2011, once Scott Walker was Governor, Robin Vos was Assembly Speaker, 
and the political tide had changed, proposals to dissolve Wisconsin's RTA's (SERTA 
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included) were introduced ultimately killing the KRM commuter rail proposal in its 
tracks (Jones, 2011). This proposal put the KRM on indefinite hold. But as I alluded to 
earlier the proposal was already doomed to fail by this point. It was not long after the 
budget committee voted to dissolve all of the state's regional transit authorities (Marley, 
2011) that KRM was officially declared dead in a July 25, 2011 Milwaukee Journal 
Sentinel article (Sandler, 2011). This move was spearheaded by Representative Robin 
Vos and backed by Governor Scott Walker and the rest of the Republican-dominated 
state Legislature. So it would seem the natural conclusion would be to blame the 
Republicans for the failure of the KRM proposal via their efforts to dissolve all of the 
state's regional transit authorities. This conclusion has been stated even recently; as a 
Journal Sentinel writer, James Rowen proclaimed, "Let's be clear: decisions principally 
by Gov. Walker and Republican legislative leaders, with the support of conservative 
commentators, have undermined transit and area residents who use it" (Rowen, 2013). 
However, by this point KRM was already "on life support" as the public policy analyst 
argued, so the attack on the RTAs was merely the final nail in the coffin. 
 Governor Jim Doyle, a Democrat and a supporter of KRM and other passenger 
rail proposals, also played an important political role in the failure of the KRM proposal. 
Doyle was insistent on the provision of a regional solution to the funding of KRM and the 
RTA. When legislators gave Milwaukee County the approval to create its own RTA and 
increase local sales taxes to help fund a Milwaukee Transit Authority, the provision was 
vetoed by Governor Jim Doyle citing his desire for a regional solution (Sandler, 2010e).  
Additionally, as the public policy analyst I interviewed commented, "[Governor] Doyle 
was not a Lee Holloway fan [and] you had a county board that people even in Democratic 
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circles did not trust." So it would seem that Governor Doyle did not want the Milwaukee 
County Board, or Lee Holloway, to be in control of a Milwaukee County only RTA and 
its funds. The transit advocate I spoke with voiced similar sentiments, saying that KRM 
leaders and business leaders thought that money at the Milwaukee County level was not 
being managed well and there was fear of having the proposal attached to this 
mismanagement. This interviewee also felt that Governor Doyle thought it would be easy 
to arrive at a regional solution and vote on the RTA again, but it proved to be harder than 
the governor had anticipated. I argue that the Governor’s veto citing the need for a more 
regional solution was an event that, while well intentioned to bring about a larger 
regional funding mechanism, showed his short-sightedness given the contentiousness of 
the previous light rail debate.  
 An analysis of the politics behind the failure of the KRM proposal reveals how 
the decisions of a few individuals changed the trajectory of the proposal from being on its 
way to preliminary engineering, to being declared dead in the wake of the 2010 
governor's race. As this analysis has shown, opposition on the part of Republicans does 
not adequately explain the failure of the KRM proposal. As I see it, there was an overall 
political shift in southeast Wisconsin that left the KRM proposal as a victim of increased 
scrutiny and fiscal austerity. There was also mixed support from Milwaukee's Democratic 
constituency and especially the Milwaukee County Board that also factored into the 
politics of KRM. The Milwaukee County Board showed mixed support for the proposal, 
and was widely known for their mismanagement of money. But most importantly, their 
insistence that western Racine County pay their fair share into the RTA became one of 
the key events that changed the trajectory of the KRM proposal. Representative Robin 
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Vos, while not initially coming out against KRM, joined forces with national 
conservative groups that scrutinized the proposal. The RTA compromise was then vetoed 
by the Governor which was probably the most decisive political move that put the KRM 
on "life support." Finally, when the 2010 governor's race got underway, the KRM and rail 
transit in general was used as an issue to wedge voters; Republicans distorted the reality 
of proposals throughout the campaign. Once Robin Vos gained his leadership position in 
the state legislature he introduced legislation to dissolve all of the state's RTA's, including 
SERTA, leaving the proposal stalled at the station. 
3. Expectations of KRM 
 This section addresses the expectations of KRM. The analysis that follows looks 
at the overall expectations for transit-oriented development and economic development, 
the specific expectations for this development in Milwaukee, Racine, and Kenosha, and 
the larger expectation of regional transit cooperation.  
 Transit advocates and planners believed that KRM was a way to stimulate high-
density urban development near stations where careful planning of land use was key 
(SEWRPC, 2011b). Transit-oriented development was seen as the most important 
element of land use development near stations with dense development patterns laid out 
in a transit and pedestrian friendly manner (Transit NOW, 2012). Throughout my 
research I saw transit-oriented development as a common discussion topic among those 
involved with the proposal. A Milwaukee Journal Sentinel article from February 23, 2006 
boasted that the KRM corridor was home to large amounts of available commercial and 
residential space that could attract "high-tech jobs and employees" once the necessary 
transportation infrastructure was in place (Mariano, 2006). So not only was development 
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of the station locations important for KRM, it was also important for this development to 
create areas of consumption and labor to promote capital accumulation. 
The prospects for economic development along the entire corridor were the 
subject of much discussion. The transit advocate interviewed described how economic 
developers from out of town would come to look at the possibilities available along the 
entire corridor and were amazed at the potential that was being missed. The transit 
advocate further discussed the vast amounts of open land along the rail lines, and near the 
proposed stations that had tremendous potential. KRM quickly became labeled as an 
economic development driver and a vast untapped resource of new jobs and transit-
oriented development. Developers were anxious to capitalize on this opportunity and 
businesses were on board as well.  
A 2007 economic impact study was completed by the University of Wisconsin - 
Milwaukee, Institute for Survey and Policy Research. The study boasted of the $560 
million impact from over 4,700 new jobs during construction, expanded tourism from 
northern Illinois with a $20 million dollar impact, and increased development along the 
corridor and especially at station locations, increasing property values up to 20% 
(Institute for Survey and Policy Research, 2007). Furthermore, the study argued that 
development in general would increase exponentially and that anywhere from 20% to 
50% of this development would not happen without the KRM. Ridership estimates 
showed about 1.7 million passengers per year would use the commuter rail service. 
SEWRPC had conducted earlier studies of the impact of KRM, but these reports were 
less focused on specific economic development outcomes. The 1998 report focused on 
land use, existing transportation infrastructure, and the planning of potential commuter 
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rail (SEWRPC, 1998). And the 2003 study, while discussing the economic development 
opportunities, was more general about the impact and less sensational about the outcomes 
(SEWRPC, 2003).  
 Not long after the 2007 economic development report was released a Racine 
Journal Times article boasted about the "substantial" economic impact KRM would have 
on the region (Burke, 2007b). Similarly, Rosemary Potter of Transit NOW in a February 
2007 Biz Times Milwaukee article discussed the findings of the report and was hopeful 
that this study would "help to quantify the substantial economic benefits that KRM is 
expected to bring to businesses in the region" (Potter, 2007). Around the same time 
SEWRPC released a report that used the figures from the UWM report to illustrate the 
economic potential of KRM (SEWRPC, 2007a). Furthermore, SERTA chairman Karl 
Ostby showed optimism for the economic development outcomes that KRM could 
produce (Ryan, 2007b). So proponents used the 2007 economic development report as an 
opportunity to frame the discussion of KRM around economic development and away 
from the issues of funding and politics that were plaguing the proposal. But while 
proponents were now framing the proposal around economic development the media still 
largely focused on funding and politics in their coverage of KRM.  
Then Rubin and Poole (2008) released the aforementioned study that questioned 
the thoroughness of the alternatives analysis conducted by SERTA, but most directly 
targeted the economic development analysis of the 2007 University of Wisconsin - 
Milwaukee study. The authors argued that the economic development heralded in the 
2007 report "appears doubtful" and criticized the alternatives analysis completed by 
SERTA and argued that several bus alternatives were not considered, especially as it 
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concerns cost versus benefit with bus alternatives costing significantly less than the 
commuter rail option. The report concluded by saying: 
We find the projections of economic and real estate benefits of commuter rail to 
 not be credible in methodology or in purported results and suggest that 
 transportation  decisions such as this be made based on transportation costs and 
 benefits (p. 7).  
The public policy analyst I interviewed also questioned the claims of economic 
development and transit-oriented development and felt they were "oversold from the get-
go." The policy analyst further argued that all the hype behind these claims may have 
been what caused people to really scrutinize the proposal making it easy for detractors to 
"poke holes in some of the arguments" and cast the proposal as a "complete boondoggle." 
And as discussed earlier, while there may have been potential for economic development 
and transit-oriented development, the attention that these discussions garnered may have 
put the proposal under deeper scrutiny. The transportation planner I spoke with was 
positive about the potential for development near the stations, but was also aware that 
some people were a bit more "sensationalist" about the potential of KRM in terms of 
creating lots of jobs, and solving additional problems.   
 In the wake of Rubin and Poole's (2008) report, economic development began to 
be a topic of discussion in the media. McIlheran (2008) and Hollenbeck (2009) focused 
on how much commuter rail would cost and questioned if rail was really going to lead to 
increased economic development. Biz Times Milwaukee (2008) coverage was more 
factual and included comment from Ken Yunker of SEWRPC who backed the findings 
from the 2007 University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee study and refuted the criticisms of 
the Rubin and Poole study. And Rice (2009) discussed Rubin's scheduled appearance in 
Milwaukee in mid-January 2009, where he would discuss his study and help people to 
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make an "informed decision" about the KRM proposal (Rice, 2009). Rubin and Poole's 
report made economic development a subject of discussion, but not in the way that 
proponents had hoped. 
 Overall, the 2007 University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee economic impact study 
changed the way proponents framed the discussion about KRM, but once the 2008 report 
by Rubin and Poole was released this framing of the discussion around economic benefits 
caused the proposal to come under deeper scrutiny. In the end, all of this discussion about 
the KRM's costs and questionable economic benefits began to cast doubt in the eyes of 
the public and left many to question not only the economic benefits of KRM, but also if 
KRM commuter rail was right for southeast Wisconsin. 
 Some of the economic development debate was less focused on transit-oriented 
development at station locations, and more focused on regional connections to the greater 
Chicago area and the economic development potential this meant for the region 
(Mariano, 2006). Throughout my analysis the connection to Chicago was seen as a large 
part of the discourse. As the transit advocate I interviewed discussed, the connection to 
Chicago was huge for KRM, especially for Racine since they lacked a rail connection to 
the economic powerhouse in the Chicago area. As I observed throughout the research this 
meant capitalizing on the economic development engine in Chicago and northern Illinois 
to foster new development here in Wisconsin. KRM was seen as a way for southeast 
Wisconsin to remain competitive in the market for new businesses and industry 
(Mariano, 2006). Furthermore, KRM would fill the void left by Amtrak service between 
Milwaukee and Chicago focusing on the suburb-to-suburb trips and city-to-suburb trips 
that are not part of the Amtrak market (Sandler, 2003). This new type of service would 
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make it easier for commuters to access jobs in the communities of northern Illinois, and 
for Milwaukee and Racine jobs to be more accessible to commuters in northern Illinois.  
 The communities along the KRM route consciously studied and planned for 
transit-oriented developments around station locations (SEWRPC, 2011b). A look at the 
SEWRPC archives revealed that all of the communities with stops along the route had 
completed transit-oriented development proposals with a variety of approaches, but all 
focusing on higher density and pedestrian access to the station (SEWRPC, 2007b). Some 
of the communities chose to use different types of developmental incentives including 
Tax Increment Financing (TIF) districts, or the expansion of current Business 
Improvement Districts (BID's), while other communities chose to leave it up to the open 
market (SEWRPC, 2007b). While different approaches were used, all had the goal of 
increasing economic development. As both the transportation planner and transit 
advocates I interviewed discussed, transit-oriented development plans for the station 
locations was a huge focus of the initial research on the KRM proposal. The specific 
plans for each station considered the local context, and the development goals of the 
community like the examples from Washington D.C. But as was also learned from the 
example of D.C., transit-oriented development near the stations in the urban areas of 
Milwaukee, Racine and Kenosha would fit in with the local urban context, whereas 
development in the more suburban or rural station locations could mean isolated islands 
of transit-oriented development in a sea of auto-centric development; which does very 
little to increase transit ridership.    
 We now turn to a look at the specific development seen for the major urban 
centers of Kenosha, Racine and Milwaukee. The areas near these stations stood out 
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because the surrounding areas were already conducive to transit-oriented development as 
they were planned in the pre-automobile age (Southeastern Regional Transit Authority, 
2010).  
 The visions for possible transit-oriented development were widely discussed for 
Milwaukee's downtown station. The research process showed that the area at the south 
end of downtown was seen as a prime area for redevelopment, especially as it relates to 
KRM. A study of the station on West St. Paul Avenue predicted a very different look for 
the area by 2020 (Ryan, 2006). The area would be transformed as the development of the 
booming Third Ward to the east met with the station development. St. Paul Avenue 
would be transformed with high density multi-story buildings with apartments and 
condos on top of ground floor retail. The sidewalks would become more pedestrian-
friendly through beautification and safety updates. The area could have thousands of new 
residential units and millions of square feet of commercial space available by 2035. What 
I gathered from my analysis was that this area would be transformed, and would 
(re)develop the south end of downtown.  
 The City of Racine had a lot to gain with the introduction of KRM commuter rail. 
My analysis revealed that Racine business leaders and local officials were hopeful for the 
potential economic development impact of KRM. These leaders saw commuter rail as 
vital to the future of Racine's economy and argued that transit options such as KRM have 
continually proven to "revitalize communities, enhance economic development, and most 
importantly, serve to create new jobs and connect workers to existing jobs" (Racine 
Journal Times, 2010). What this shows is how the city was depending on KRM service to 
drive economic development and provide needed connections to the economies of 
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Milwaukee and Chicago. As Racine Mayor John Dickert stated, "To rebuild a city like 
Racine, you have to have infrastructure . . . you have to have an effective and efficient 
transit system" (Rigney-Baxter, 2010).  
 Racine-based SC Johnson saw commuter rail as a way to attract young 
professionals to their company (Grundle, 2006). This is something Rosemary Potter, 
executive director of Transit NOW, agreed with citing studies that show "young talent 
will go where commuter rail is located" (Grundle, 2006). In my assessment, SC Johnson 
saw the commuter rail as important for attracting the right kind of employees to work at 
their headquarters. The transit advocate I interviewed argued that S.C Johnson made 
commuter rail a priority. They attended budget hearings, and lobbied in Madison because 
they saw the value in KRM commuter rail, not only in terms of economic development, 
but also with the regional connections to Milwaukee and Chicago. Having a large 
international company advocating for KRM highlighted the importance of the proposal 
for the region, and Racine specifically.  
 The downtown Racine Business Improvement District saw KRM as a way to 
increase business activity, and keep local businesses thriving (Downtown Racine 
Business Improvement District No. 1, 2011). With a vested interest in keeping downtown 
Racine a vibrant place for shopping, dining, and other activities the prospects for 
economic development surrounding the station was a huge priority for the downtown 
Racine businesses. As the transit advocated I interviewed discussed, the Racine station 
had the potential to revive an area of the city near the proposed station. Likewise, Joel 
Rast, Professor of Political Science and Urban Studies, and the director of the Center for 
Economic Development at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, argued that the KRM 
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commuter rail proposal would likely help Racine even more than it would Milwaukee 
(Steinkraus, 2011). I see the evidence as clear; Racine was counting on the KRM to 
create economic development both near the station and to stimulate development 
throughout the city. The connection to both Milwaukee and Chicago had a huge potential 
to revive the economy in the city. 
 The City of Kenosha knew the benefits of transit-oriented development through 
the construction of their Harbor Park development, which was specifically tied to the 
Metra station in Kenosha (Transit NOW, 2012). There were certainly expectations for 
future development near the station and continued economic development in the area 
once the KRM line was also tied to the station. My research showed that Kenosha was 
ready to expand upon their economic development agenda, especially in the station area, 
even before the future of KRM was certain. In-fact the city took on the task of renovating 
their century old station by raising money on their own and applying for their own federal 
money separate from the KRM proposal (Rohde, 2010).  
 The expectations of regional transit cooperation were also tied up in the debate 
about KRM. As the public policy analyst I interviewed argued, KRM was about more 
than just the operation of a commuter rail line, it was also about the creation of an RTA 
serving Milwaukee, Racine, and Kenosha Counties. When then-Governor Doyle 
introduced the legislation for regions to create transit authorities he was hopeful that this 
would allow them to come together and work on the transit issues facing their specific 
areas (Transit NOW, n.d.). The transit advocate I interviewed saw KRM as "a platform 
for our region to start working together" and gave new hope to the creation of an RTA. 
However, I argue that the vision for the way these RTA's would have been structured 
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may have been beyond the capabilities of southeast Wisconsin. All of my interviewee’s 
indicated that, local leaders were hopeful that KRM would bring about the creation of an 
RTA as a solution to the funding crisis of local bus systems; as I see it none of them had 
the political will to get it done.  
 The policy analyst I spoke with discussed how then Milwaukee County Executive 
Scott Walker was supportive of the idea of an RTA and even tried to pull Waukesha 
County in as part of it. The transit advocate I spoke with clarified how, although this bill 
did not include Waukesha County, they would have been able to join under certain 
conditions. The prospect of bringing Waukesha County into the RTA was monumental, 
considering the legacy of the east-west corridor debate. However, the public policy 
analyst clarified that Waukesha County officials were not in support, so that idea quickly 
went by the wayside. The policy analyst argued that the fundamental reason why Walker 
was not against KRM at first was the prospect of an RTA that could help support a 
struggling MCTS. But as became clear in my analysis, his staunch opposition to a transit 
sales tax to fund local buses showed that he supported an RTA in concept but, when it 
came to the reality of paying for it, his support waned. In addition, the transit advocate I 
interviewed argued that Waukesha County officials were influenced to not join the RTA 
because of the falsehoods articulated by Robin Vos and his cohorts. In my estimation, 
this was the moment when the talk of regional transit cooperation turned divisive and 
KRM's future became questionable. 
 The transportation planner I spoke with felt that SERTA was not only essential 
for KRM to be funded and operated, but that it was also a key expectation of the 
proposal. The transportation planner also felt that ultimately the dissolving of SERTA, 
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and other RTA's in the state, was the primary reason for the KRM's "indefinite 
postponement." However, as my analysis has shown there are several other key decisions 
by individual actors along the way that paved the way for the proposals failure.  
 Throughout my analysis it became clear that the biggest expectation of KRM was 
the creation of an RTA - an RTA that could have supplied both local busses and regional 
commuter rail with dedicated funding sources and finally link the region with transit 
service that would have been "easy, convenient and reliable" (Transit NOW, 2012). This 
expectation became the largest issue attached with KRM and transit advocates, policy 
analysts and planners agreed. However, this expectation could have also spelled its 
demise since those against the proposal knew that KRM was attached to the larger goal of 
regional transit cooperation, something opponents maintained would lead to loss of local 
control and the funneling of funds towards the needs of other counties. Then Governor 
Doyle vetoed the Milwaukee Transit Authority proposed after SERTA was unable to 
come to a consensus on a funding mechanism for KRM and the local bus systems. This 
seemed to be the best hope for a regional funding consensus, especially in light of earlier 
debates.  
  Let’s refer back to the earlier examples of Atlanta (Golembiewsi & Kiepper, 
1976) and south Florida (Alpert et al., 2006), where the final reality of regional transit 
cooperation looked very different from their original visions. The structure of the 
compromise for the KRM and SERTA was very similar to the example of south Florida 
with each county keeping local funding autonomy for their local systems, and there being 
a separate funding source for the regional rail system. Along with this, Ulberg’s models 
of regional transit cooperation (as cited in Meligrana, 1999) are also significant to KRM 
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in understanding the degree of integration seen in southeast Wisconsin, and the 
possibilities for coordination. To review, Ulberg's hierarchy consisted of: complete 
independence, informal coordination, formal coordination, partial integration, and full 
integration. The bus systems in Milwaukee County and the cities of Kenosha and Racine 
would most likely be considered in the category of "complete independence," with most 
service stopping at the County lines in the example of MCTS or city boundaries in 
Kenosha and Racine. It is possible that the compromise vetoed by then-Governor Doyle 
(and also seen in the example of south Florida) could have moved the region closer to 
goal of complete integration and could have been considered "partial integration," with a 
regional agency coordinating transit and, in the case of KRM, operating the service, while 
the local systems would be run independently and the two systems interacting at transfer 
stations.  
 When viewing KRM (and SERTA) and the compromise that came out of the 
legislature through Ulberg's hierarchy, it is easy to see the change in regional cooperation 
that was part of this compromise. Viewing the issue of regional transit coordination as a 
hierarchy as well as through the examples of other transit agencies, one can get a clearer 
vision of what regional transit coordination can look like compared to what it was 
previously, and the different ways it can work. I argue that if then-Governor Doyle had 
considered the alternative approaches to regional transit cooperation seen in Atlanta and 
south Florida, or if he had considered the major steps up the regional transit hierarchy 
that the compromise brought southeast Wisconsin, KRM could be running today and 
local buses would be funded with dedicated funding sources.  
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As I see it, KRM had two predominant expectations. First was the provision of 
economic development and transit-oriented development at the station locations and 
throughout the entire region. And second, but probably most important, was the creation 
of a Regional Transit Authority and agreement over regional transit issues. 
Unfortunately, KRM would never accomplish either, and perhaps the expectation of one 
33-mile long commuter rail line to bring about regional transit cooperation and expansive 
economic development was more than should have been expected. KRM was expected to 
transform the south end of downtown Milwaukee near the station, reinvigorate the 
struggling economy of Racine, and expand upon Kenosha's vibrant transit-oriented 
developments. In addition KRM was to bring about cooperation between three counties 
with varying demographics, and lifestyles. I argue that it was not only the expectation of 
creating an RTA, but what that RTA was supposed to look like that doomed KRM. The 
example of south Florida's RTA provides parallels to the KRM proposal. Both involved 
three counties connecting major population centers and both had a struggle with the 
provision of an RTA to serve the entire area. I believe that if then-Governor Doyle had 
not vetoed the separate Milwaukee Transit Authority that was to fund and run MCTS and 
have KRM remain separate, the Milwaukee area would have a similar set-up to the south 
Florida RTA and could be running today. In the end, the expectations for economic 
development that were highly scrutinized as part of the shift in politics in the wake of the 
2008 financial crisis, and Governor Doyle's expectation for the type of regional transit 
cooperation he wanted to see were important factors in the demise of the KRM proposal. 
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4. Funding Issues for KRM 
 This section looks at the role of funding in the failure of the KRM proposal. My 
analysis showed that funding played a role in the KRM proposal's failure in three key 
ways: the large amount of public funding the KRM would require, the federal funding 
requirements, and the local funding obstacles.    
 Early on, it became clear that KRM would require a large amount of public 
funding to cover capital costs as well as operating costs. With total KRM capital costs 
estimated to be about $230 million (Ryan, 2010c), with some estimates as high as $250 
million (Rubin and Poole, 2008), and a low operating cost recovery rate (the amount of 
costs recovered by fares) of 15-17% (SEWRPC, 2003), funding was sure to be an 
obstacle for KRM. This funding dilemma, however, was not unique to KRM, as other 
new commuter rail systems had similar cost recovery figures (SEWRPC, 2003). More 
established systems typically boast recovery rates of around 40-60%. Reflecting back on 
Altshuler and Luberoff's (2003) earlier discussion of transit funding and remembering the 
structure of transit funding in the 1950s, we are reminded how transit used to be expected 
to recover all of its costs from fares, which explains why this cost recovery figure is so 
important to the viability of new proposals. Neoliberal devolution also plays into this, 
where federal transportation legislation continues to subsidize highway infrastructure 
costs at a higher rate than transit, leaving state and local governments to cover a larger 
percentage of transit project expenses. 
 SERTA was applying for the federal government's "New Starts" program which 
could have covered as much as 60% of the costs of construction for KRM (Thoreson, 
2010). As discussed earlier, the New Starts program was a federally funded program for 
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new fixed guideway transit service available to local and regional authorities on a 
competitive basis (Lowe, 2013). SERTA and SEWRPC knew that securing this funding 
was essential for the proposal to move forward. SEWRPC was optimistic that Wisconsin 
could get this funding even given that the state had has never before received federal 
money for a proposal such as this, as the process tended to favor larger urban centers like 
New York, Houston, and Los Angeles (Thoreson, 2010). 
 During the application process, the FTA voiced concerns about the KRM proposal 
because a dedicated source of funding was not secured for the local bus systems in 
Milwaukee County and the cities of Racine and Kenosha (Sandler, 2010c). The FTA said 
they would allow preliminary engineering, but that funding for the final stages of the 
proposal would be held until the funding issues were resolved. The transportation planner 
I spoke with agreed that the FTA voiced concerns about local funding of buses and that 
SEWRPC actually pulled their initial application in 2007 for the New Starts Program 
because of these concerns. So while federal funding was potentially available to cover a 
large amount of the capital costs of KRM, the proposal was hampered by the issues of 
local funding that had to be figured out before KRM could move any further.  
 The transportation planner I interviewed argued that the issue of funding for 
transit is unique in the Milwaukee area since funding is largely dependent on the state 
and federal governments. This funding has not increased with inflation leaving counties 
and local governments to fill the gap using property taxes. Therefore, the biggest issue for 
funding with the KRM was finding a dedicated funding source. 
 Many local funding proposals for KRM were floated around including additional 
gas taxes, state funding (Sandler, 2004), using the sales tax revenue from vehicle 
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purchases (Walker, 2007), or an overall sales tax increase anywhere from .05% to 0.5% 
(Resler, 2006), and finally an increase of the car rental fee by $13 (Grundle, 2007). While 
each of these solutions was debated in the media, SERTA focused on the car rental fee 
and sales taxes. Each of these solutions had their benefits and drawbacks, but my analysis 
showed that the car rental fee increase had the most vocal backlash.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 Car-rental companies came out against the car rental fee saying it would hurt their 
business by driving away customers and could force them to reduce staffing (Ryan, 
2009a). The transportation planner I spoke with also discussed the pushback from the 
rental car industry itself. It was clear from the research that car rental companies felt 
targeted and feared the repercussions of these extra fees. There was even a bill introduced 
in congress that would prevent local and federal governments from imposing such fees. 
Those in support of the bill, including consumer advocacy groups, auto manufacturers 
and rental agencies, said that these fees should not go to "funding projects that have 
nothing to do with renting vehicles" (Sandler & Marrero, 2010). Despite this vocal 
backlash, however, the car rental fee remained part of the funding mechanism for KRM.     
 The idea of a regional sales tax seemed the consensus way to go. As one Racine 
citizen stated in the Feb. 2, 2007 Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, "A small extra tax to build 
and operate this KRM commuter rail line is not asking a great deal from the general 
public" (Myers, 2007). However, political support for a transit tax was difficult. State 
Senator John Lehman of Racine said that the voters in his district would never approve of 
a sales tax to support transit (Ryan, 2009b) and Milwaukee County Executive Walker, as 
described earlier, was also opposed to a sales tax to support transit.   
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 One thing became clear throughout my analysis - Milwaukee County officials 
were particularly important in the debate over funding, since they were concerned about 
funding going directly to KRM and not helping the struggling Milwaukee County Transit 
System (Ryan, 2007a). One of the goals in establishing SERTA was that a regional 
source of funding would be identified for KRM, which could also to help support local 
bus systems. In May of 2007 SERTA officials decided on a $13 car rental fee increase to 
fund KRM and a 0.5% sales tax to fund local transit, but the sales tax increase was later 
tabled leaving only the car rental fee (Ryan, 2007b). This provided funding for KRM, but 
not for local bus systems. Subsequently, the $13 car rental fee was denied by the state 
legislature as a funding source, and the RTA legislation that created SERTA as a 
temporary authority did not pass so funding was again on hold (Transit NOW, n.d.). In 
my view, despite support for the proposal from residents and many local officials, state 
politics played into the funding for KRM and an RTA, where the proposal was supported 
in principle but not in practice. 
 In Milwaukee, voters narrowly approved an advisory referendum in support of a 
1% sales tax increase to pay for transit as well as other services (Ryan, 2009b). This 
meant that a sales tax in Milwaukee could be initiated to fund transit. Similar measures in 
Racine and Kenosha failed by large margins with 80% of Racine voters and up to 88% of 
Kenosha County voters opposing a sales tax to fund transit (Sandler, 2010b). So while 
Milwaukee voters understood the need for dedicated funding for transit, Racine and 
Kenosha County residents were soundly against this measure. As the transit advocate I 
spoke with argued, the people of Milwaukee are generally supportive of transit, but the 
surrounding suburban counties do not appreciate it and don't want to pay for it. This 
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points to another interesting phenomenon found throughout my research - the urban 
versus rural divide that was a huge factor in determining funding for KRM. In the end, 
Milwaukee County was prepared to levy a sales tax to fund transit, while Kenosha and 
Racine were not.  
 The 2009-2011 state budget, signed on June 29, 2009, established SERTA as a 
permanent RTA and allowed them to fund and operate KRM commuter rail using the 
rental car fee (Transit NOW, n.d.). This measure should have put KRM over its final 
hurdle and the proposal should have been ready to move forward, but as we will see, the 
continued debate over a regional funding solution for KRM and local buses became the 
real issue. The transit planner I interviewed explained how the Joint Finance Committee 
divided SERTA (and KRM) from local bus funding, forming the Milwaukee Transit 
Authority. This would allow Milwaukee County to levy a local tax to support MCTS, 
outside of the regional framework for KRM (Sander, 2010e). However, the governor 
vetoed the proposed Milwaukee Transit Authority citing his desire for a regional solution. 
I argue that this move, on the part of Governor Doyle would prove to be more significant 
than he had anticipated.  
 As the transit advocate I spoke with argued, Doyle probably thought that it 
wouldn't be a big deal for the counties to come up with a regional solution for funding 
buses and the KRM together under one mechanism. What I don't think he considered was 
that this may have been the best compromise on which local officials could agree. I also 
argue that he was completely unaware of the scrutiny passenger rail would face in the 
upcoming 2010 Governor's race, and how it would affect the funding for an RTA.  
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 The veto meant that SERTA could continue progress on the KRM, but that 
dedicated funding for local bus systems had not been agreed upon. However, this was not 
enough to keep the KRM moving forward, since a good commuter rail system needs a 
good local bus system to serve as a feeder. Funding for local buses was very important, a 
point with which the transit advocate I interviewed also agreed. Unfortunately, an April 
22, 2010 Daily Reporter article indicated that the debate over a sales tax for transit would 
be put off for another year (Ryan, 2010b); which would move the issue into a new 
political climate under the Governorship of Scott Walker and a Republican-dominated 
legislature.  
 All three of the individuals I interviewed agreed that funding for KRM was 
wrapped up in the larger issue of funding for local bus systems, especially MCTS. The 
transportation planner discussed how SERTA board members were worried about the 
funding of what they called a "shiny new train" when local bus systems were struggling.  
  In summary, funding for KRM was a concern, especially given the low fare-
recovery rate and high initial capital costs of the proposal. Soon funding was also 
attached to the need to stabilize the funding issues of the local bus systems, especially 
MCTS. For KRM to be successful, local bus connections were essential to get riders to 
their final destinations. But the region just could not come up with a consensus for how to 
fund KRM and local buses together as the counties kept fighting against each other 
instead of working with each other. The RTA legislation that came out of the Joint 
Finance Committee separated funding for MCTS from the KRM proposal, something that 
Governor Doyle vetoed; a move which I argue made the future of KRM uncertain. Now 
KRM funding was secured, but funding for the buses was in question with pressure 
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looming from the FTA to have the dedicated funding secured before the proposal could 
move beyond preliminary engineering. 
5. KRM and the Light Rail Debate 
 This section addresses the question of the impact of the previous light rail debate 
(and the larger east-west corridor debate) on the failure of the KRM proposal. My 
analysis revealed that the light rail debate impacted the KRM proposal in three key ways: 
labeling commuter rail as a better alternative to light rail, the connections between the 
two proposals, and the different approaches taken. 
 Throughout my analysis it became clear that the light rail debate left behind a 
legacy of opposition, and somehow KRM seemed to be able to avoid this. As Larry 
Sandler from the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel reported, the idea of commuter rail brought 
widespread support and didn't have to contend with the same level of resistance as light 
rail proposals (Sandler, 2003). The public policy analyst I interviewed argued that, "KRM 
came about and almost happened as a direct result of what happened with the east-west 
corridor." In the beginning stages of the KRM proposal, those that were opposed to light 
rail because of the expense involved saw commuter rail as a better alternative. And as the 
transportation planner I spoke with argued, those who understood the different purposes 
of light rail and commuter rail never connected the two proposals and judged them on 
their own merits. So perhaps the legacy of the light rail debate was positive for the KRM, 
at least in the way it framed the issue of commuter rail as a better alternative to light rail. 
However, as the public policy analyst argued, soon all rail turned politically divisive and 
became something conservatives did not support. Similarly, the transportation planner 
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discussed how those that were just anti-rail connected the two proposals into a larger 
framework of passenger rail as being unnecessary. 
 The proposals did have a few connections in terms of their demise, their goal of 
regional cooperation, and their connection in a broader debate about passenger rail. In 
both cases, while funding seemed to be the issue that was debated; the actual demise of 
both proposals was decided by Republican officials making a conscious decision to stop 
each of the rail proposals in their tracks. In the case of light rail, Waukesha County 
Executive Finley killed light rail by vetoing further study of the east-west corridor. In the 
case of KRM the Republican dominated legislature disbanded all of the state's regional 
transit authorities (RTA), taking away the power of the SERTA board to fund and operate 
the KRM line. However, as my analysis of the KRM has revealed, the actions of other 
political figures put the future of the KRM proposal in question long before this 
legislative action. 
 Both proposals were also part of the larger issue of regional transit cooperation. 
While the light rail was about cooperation between Waukesha and Milwaukee counties, 
the KRM was about cooperation between Milwaukee, Racine and Kenosha counties and 
any other county that wanted to join the RTA. But the proposals were still impacted by 
the larger issues of political polarization and urban versus rural lifestyles in the region; 
themes that I saw through my research on both light rail and KRM. The transit advocate I 
spoke with pointed to these issues of Milwaukee versus the suburbs that were common in 
both debates. The mere fact that regional cooperation for transit in southeast Wisconsin 
has now failed twice is indicative of the divisiveness of these issues and will continue to 
be the legacy of both proposals. Additionally, as argued earlier the compromise that came 
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out of the east-west corridor set a precedent for the regional transportation priorities of 
southeast Wisconsin. 
 The east-west corridor debate also relates to the KRM debate in that the 
Milwaukee streetcar proposal is slated to connect with the Milwaukee Intermodal Station, 
where the KRM would have terminated, in downtown Milwaukee. And so, in many ways 
the two proposals became linked, along with high-speed rail from Chicago to 
Minneapolis through Milwaukee and Madison, as wasteful big-government projects that 
would become nothing but a tax-burden. And in my opinion, had the KRM commuter rail 
been established, the future of the Milwaukee streetcar line would be bright; since it 
would help connect commuters terminating at the downtown train station to the rest of 
downtown Milwaukee. As Kris Martinsek said in a July 26, 2003 Milwaukee Journal 
Sentinel article, "I think the biggest tragedy would be if these two projects [light rail and 
commuter rail] ended up getting pitted against one another" (Sandler, 2003). And while 
they were never pitted against each other, I do see the legacy of the east-west corridor 
debate as something that KRM had to contend with.  
 As pointed out in my interview with the transit advocate, the two proposals also 
differed in their approach. My interviewee explained how light rail, "could have gotten a 
lot further had there been a more reasonable strategy of education up-front." The transit 
advocate pointed out how the first few years of KRM was for educating the public, 
meeting with business people, doing presentations and merely getting the information 
out. I see this as perhaps a positive outcome of the light rail debate, where a change in 
approach was seen as the best way to move KRM forward. The light rail skipped this 
important step and so the public wasn't informed and the debate was less about the facts 
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and more about the ideologies of the Waukesha County Republicans and Milwaukee 
mayor John Norquist. Unfortunately, the KRM would be hampered with the falsehoods 
touted by the opposition, a backlash that proponents didn't see coming. Perhaps the 
strategy difference only worked to a limited extent, as the same debates about rail came 
back to the surface.  
 The earlier debate on light rail in Milwaukee had a profound influence on the 
KRM proposal but not necessarily in the way I had initially thought. The KRM commuter 
rail proposal might have actually been helped by the earlier light rail debate in terms of 
having support as a better transit alternative and also being approached in a more 
grassroots way. While the transportation planner I spoke with didn't see the two as 
necessarily related and the transit advocate mainly saw a difference in the approaches of 
the proposals, there are still some important links between the proposals. The two 
proposals took place at different times, served different corridors and provided different 
services, but they are linked to the broader context of passenger rail in Wisconsin that has 
a history of divisiveness. Both were victims of decisions by Republican leaders, and both 
were discussed in terms of the creation of an RTA. Additionally, both had the constraints 
of political polarization, contrasting lifestyles, and regional feuds about transit funding. 
And even though this legacy still followed the KRM, my analysis showed that the KRM 
was able to still move forward despite these obstacles. While the legacy of the light rail 
debate is still prominent, it appears that KRM was able to overcome the hurdles faced by 
light rail. And I argue that KRM could have moved forward despite (and possibly 
because of) the legacy light rail left behind. 
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Conclusion  
  In the end, I conclude that while one specific legislative action on the part of a 
Republican-dominated legislature may have officially killed the proposal (or put it on 
hold indefinitely as two of my interviewees suggested) - this action was simply one event 
in a broader political debate about KRM and its funding and expectations. This is not to 
discount the influence of an auto-dominated culture, or the legacy of the light rail debate; 
but as my analysis showed, the proposal could have (and most likely would have) moved 
forward despite these issues.  
 KRM found itself within the economic context of a political shift that took place 
in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, and the broader local debate about funding for 
KRM and local bus systems. In addition, the highly touted economic development 
forecasts were questioned and left opponents to challenge the viability of KRM. 
Representative Robin Vos became a vocal opponent of the proposal, which as some 
argued was a product of the inclusion of western Racine County in the funding scope of 
SERTA (and KRM). However, the largest obstacle to the KRM proposal was the veto by 
Governor Doyle of the RTA compromise that would have let KRM move forward and 
provided dedicated funding for local buses. The expectation of a fully regional solution 
on the part of the Governor, I argue, was more than southeast Wisconsin was capable of, 
given the ideological division of the past. The KRM also entered into the Republican 
gubernatorial primary where opposition to the KRM became a conservative campaigning 
requirement and then came to the forefront of the 2010 gubernatorial race. But by this 
time, KRM was already "on life support" and the final nail in the coffin came after Scott 
Walker took office with the legislature dissolving the state's RTAs.  
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 So while the legislature’s decision to dissolve all the state's RTAs is seen as the 
official demise of KRM, I argue that earlier political moves on the part of politicians on 
both sides of the aisle put the future of KRM in question. It was the decision of the 
Milwaukee County Board to insist on the inclusion of western Racine County in the 
funding scope of the RTA and Doyle's expectation of what the funding mechanisms and 
structure of an RTA should look like (as opposed to what is feasible in the local context), 
that was flawed. It was not divisive or partisan politics that killed the KRM, but politics 
that did not consider compromise.  
Lessons Learned 
 This research led me to three important issues from the KRM proposal's failure 
that could provide lessons learned for future passenger rail proposals: the importance of 
how the proposal is framed, the influence of individual actors, and that politics isn't 
necessarily partisan. 
 The KRM commuter rail proposal was framed as an economic development 
driver and as the solution to the mobility issues of southeast Wisconsin. The 1997 
economic impact report boasted of job creation, expanded tourism, increased property 
values, and increased economic development from the KRM, but these claims were 
refuted by conservative researchers. As argued by the policy analyst I interviewed, the 
economic claims seen in the report and heralded by proponents may have actually led the 
KRM to be put under deeper scrutiny by conservatives and anti-rail groups. Along with 
this is the way KRM was framed as the key to solving the mobility issues of the region. 
However, soon support from Republicans and Democrats alike began to wane as low 
ridership figures of 1.7 million annual riders were discussed and as many officials, 
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especially in Milwaukee, feared that local bus systems would end up suffering if KRM 
was to move forward. The lesson learned here for future passenger rail proposals is the 
importance of how the proposal is framed. In the case of KRM, the way it was framed put 
the project under deeper scrutiny and factored into the failure of the KRM proposal. 
 Another lesson learned from KRM was the influence of individual actors. While 
KRM is not necessarily unique in how individual actors influenced the progress of the 
proposal, it does highlight the large number of competing individual agendas that all 
worked in different ways and in varying degrees to kill the KRM proposal. Robin Vos, 
while never showing support for the KRM, didn't initially publically oppose the proposal. 
Then as a product of the changing political tide, he became one of the most vocal 
opponents of KRM. Scott Walker initially supported KRM because of the possibility of 
forming an RTA, but changed his stance as the political tide shifted, but also likely 
because of his shift from a Republican leader in a Democratic County to running for 
state-wide office. Members of the Milwaukee County Board such as Michael Mayo and 
Lee Holloway, along with Representative Gwen Moore and Mayor Tom Barrett, were 
concerned about what KRM would mean for the already struggling MCTS. However, 
most important to this discussion is Governor Jim Doyle who vetoed the RTA 
compromise that came out of the legislature, citing his desire for a more regional 
solution. And while his desire for a more regional solution had its merits, the expectation 
for the type of regional transit authority that he wanted was a decisive moment in the fate 
of the KRM proposal. The lesson to be learned here is that, when you look at why the 
proposal failed, you get a closer view of the individual actors involved and how their 
competing agendas stopped the proposal from moving forward.  
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 Finally, one of the most interesting lessons to be learned from the KRM 
proposal's failure is that the politics surrounding the proposal was not necessarily 
partisan. While there was ideological polarization attached to the politics of KRM, it 
seemed to be more about local issues and personal political agenda's than Republican 
versus Democrat. There were several Democrats in Milwaukee, a traditional Democratic 
stronghold, who had their reservations about the KRM, such as Representative Gwen 
Moore, Milwaukee Mayor Tom Barrett, and members of the Milwaukee County Board. 
These Milwaukee leaders were concerned over funding for MCTS but also if KRM was 
in the best interest of Milwaukee and its residents. Democratic Governor Jim Doyle, 
while supportive of KRM, seemed more concerned with his vision of the structure of an 
RTA than with the repercussions that his veto on the RTA compromise would have on 
the future of KRM. So while it would be easy to blame the fate of the KRM proposal on 
Republican law-makers and partisan politics, the evidence shows that the failure of KRM 
is more a product of competing political agendas and divisions over local issues than it 
was about partisan politics. The lesson learned here is that politics is not always partisan, 
and in the case of KRM became much more about competing individual interests and 
agenda's than Republican versus Democrat, or conservative versus liberal.  
Further Research 
 While I feel my interviews with three key stakeholders in the proposal, and a 
thorough analysis of archival and newspaper sources was sufficient to answer the 
research questions I set out to answer, further research into the KRM proposal could and 
should be completed to look at a wider range of issues attached to the proposal. This 
could include interviews or surveys of transit riders who depend on transit and how this 
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proposal would have affected them, or interviews or surveys of potential riders of the 
KRM and their feelings on the proposal. In addition, talking to the business community, 
such as SC Johnson and other businesses in the corridor, and getting their perspective on 
KRM and how it would have benefitted them, would be helpful. Additionally, I did not 
explore the influence of factors such as race, ethnicity or poverty; or the reason(s) why 
this corridor was chosen. Finally, I am hopeful that scholars from a variety of disciplines 
will continue to study the failure of passenger rail proposals to understand why they 
failed and how future proposals can be approached. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
74 
 
 
 
References 
Alpert, L., Gainsborough, J., & Wallis, A. (2006). Building the Capacity to Act 
Regionally: Formation of the Regional Transportation Authority in South Florida. 
Urban Affairs Review, 42 (2), 143-168. 
Altshuler, A. (1979). The Urban Transportation System: Politics and Policy Innovation. 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Altshuler, A. & Luberoff, D. (2003). Mega-Projects: The Changing Politics of Urban 
Public Investment. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
Alvord, K. (2000). Divorce Your Car! Ending the Love Affair with the Automobile. 
Gabriola Island, B.C., Canada: New Society Publishers. 
Bergman, A., Gliebe, J., & Strathman, J. (2011). Modeling Access Mode Choice for 
Inter-Suburban Commuter Rail. Journal of Public Transportation, 14 (4), 23-42. 
Bipartisan Policy Center. (2011). Strategies for Defining the Core Federal Role in 
Surface Transportation. Energy & Infrastructure Program, National 
Transportation Policy Project. Retrieved from 
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/NTPP%20Paper_0.pdf 
Biz Times Milwaukee. (2008, December 16). Libertarian group says KRM's benefits are 
overstated. Biz Times Milwaukee. Retrieved from 
http://www.biztimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20081216/ENEWSLETTER
S02/312169990/image1.gif/&template=printart 
Blainey, S., Hickford, A. & Preston, J. (2012). Barriers to Passenger Rail Use: A Review 
of the Evidence. Transport Reviews, 32 (6), 675-696. 
Bowen, D. J. (2008). Chicago: Passenger Rail Hub. Railway Age. June, 19-23. 
———. (2011). Rail Transit Taps Local Powers. Railway Age. September, 83-89. 
Bullard, R., Torres, A. & Johnson, G. (2000). Sprawl City: Race, Politics and Planning 
in Atlanta. Washington D.C.: Island Press, 52-59. 
Burke, M. (2007a, May 30). Business backs Lehman, pressures Vos on KRM proposal. 
Racine Journal Times. Retrieved from 
http://journaltimes.com/news/local/business-backs-lehman-pressures-vos-on-krm-
proposal/article_e6348ffd-4364-5bd9-9c8e-c5f5644567d2.html 
———. (2007b, February 7). Study: Commuter rail would have 'substantial' economic 
impact. Racine Journal Times. Retrieved from 
http://journaltimes.com/news/local/study-commuter-rail-would-have-substantial-
economic-impact/article_5f569de0-1612-59bf-bd3b-44100b05e37e.html 
75 
 
 
 
Cameron, M. (1997). Transportation Efficiency and Equity in Southern California: Are 
They Compatible? In R. Bullard & G. Johnson's, Just Transportation: 
Dismantling Race and Class Barriers to Mobility, 53-67. 
Casey, J., Jr. (1995). The Politics of Congestion and Implementation: Milwaukee's 
Freeways and the Proposed Light Rail and Transit System. Marquette Law 
Review, 78, 675-733. 
———. (1998). Bridging the Great Divide: SEWRPC, Politics, and Regional 
Cooperation. Marquette Law Review, 81 (3), 705-760. 
Cervero, R. (1998). The Transit Metropolis: A Global Inquiry. Washington, D.C.: Island 
Press. 
———. (2006). Transit Oriented Development's Ridership Bonus: A Product of Self-
Selection and Public Policies. University of California Transportation Center, 
Berkeley. 
Cervero, R., & Duncan, M. (2002). Benefits of Proximity to Rail on Housing Markets: 
Experiences in Santa Clara County. Journal of Public Transportation, 5 (1), 1-18. 
Downtown Racine Business Improvement District No. 1. (2011, May 24). Commentary: 
We urge Joint Finance Committee to restore transit funding. Racine Journal 
Times. Retrieved from 
http://journaltimes.com/news/opinion/editorial/commentary-we-urge-joint-
finance-committee-to-restore-transit-funding/article_a4fb243c-86eb-11e0-bcc7-
001cc4c03286.html 
Envirodyne Engineers, Inc. (1993). Chicago-Milwaukee Rail Corridor Study, Phase I 
Report, Presented to: Wisconsin Department of Transportation and Illinois 
Department of Transportation.  
Forster, S. (2009, September 11). Neumann questions viability of commuter rail line. 
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel. Retrieved from 
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.lib.uwm.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/?sterms=P
UBLICATION%28Milwaukee+journal+sentinel%29&verb=sr&csi=299488 
Goddard, S. (1996). Getting There: The Epic Struggle Between Road and Rail in the 
American Century. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Golembiewski, R. & Kiepper, A. (1976). MARTA: Toward An Effective, Open Giant. 
Public Administration Review. January/February, 46-60. 
Grava, S. (2003). Urban Transportation Systems: Choices for Communities. New York: 
McGraw-Hill. 
Graham, A. L. (2013). Fort Worth Ready for commuter rail, consultant says. Fort Worth 
Business Press, February 25-March 3, 12. 
76 
 
 
 
Grundle, J. (2006, March 2). Groups voice support for passenger rail in southeastern 
Wisconsin. Daily Reporter. Retrieved from 
http://dailyreporter.com/2006/03/01/groups-voice-support-for-passenger-rail/  
———. (2007, May 16). Alderman proposes extending Kenosha-Racine-Milwaukee 
commuter rail line. Daily Reporter. Retrieved from 
http://dailyreporter.com/2007/05/16/alderman-proposes-extending-krm-line/  
Gutfreund, O. (2004). Twentieth Century Sprawl: Highways and the Reshaping of the 
American Landscape. New York: Oxford University Press, kindle edition. 
Harvey, D. (2007). A Brief History of Neoliberalism. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Hayes, P. (2010). Master Planners: Fifty Years of Regional Planning in Southeastern 
Wisconsin: 1960-2010. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.  
Hollenbeck, R. (2009, January 2). KRM economic benefits aren't credible study states. 
CudahyNOW [blogs]. Retrieved from 
http://www.cudahynow.com/blogs/communityblogs/44049037.html 
Interrante, J. (1983). The Road to Autopia: The Automobile and the Spatial 
Transformation of American Culture in D. Lewis and L. Goldstein (Eds.),  The 
Automobile and American Culture (pp. 89-104). Ann Arbor: The University of 
Michigan Press. 
Institute for Survey & Policy Research. (2007). Community Economic Impact Study of 
the Proposed Kenosha-Racine-Milwaukee (KRM) Commuter Rail. University of 
Wisconsin - Milwaukee.  
Institute of Public Administration. (1979). Financing Transit: Alternatives for Local 
Government. Prepared for: U.S. Department of Transportation.  
Jackson, K. (1985). Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Johnson, N. A. (2014). Off Track: The Failure of Light-Rail in Milwaukee. e.polis, online 
student journal of Urban Studies. University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Volume 
VI, Winter 2014. Available at 
http://www4.uwm.edu/letsci/urbanstudies/epolis/current/upload/LightRailSubmission.pdf 
Jones, D. W. (2008). Mass Motorization + Mass Transit: An American History and 
Policy Analysis. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Jones, S. (2011, February 28). Regional transit authority next on GOP chopping block - 
Without RTA, KRM would stall. Racine Journal Times. Retrieved from 
http://journaltimes.com/news/local/regional-transit-authority-next-on-gop-
chopping-block--/article_b3d3994c-439a-11e0-b4c3-001cc4c03286.html  
77 
 
 
 
Lang, J. (2005). Challenges to the Urban Growth Machine: The Case of Light Rail in 
Milwaukee (Unpublished Master's Thesis). University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee, 
Milwaukee, WI. 
Levinson, H., Allen, J. G. & Hoey, W. F. (2012). Light Rail Since World War II: 
Abandonments, Survivals and Revivals. Journal of Urban Technology, 19 (1), 65-
79. 
Lowe, K. (2013). Funding Rail: Federal Decisions and Local Financing. Public Works 
Management & Policy. January.  
Lyles, W. (2007, March 22). Cooperation is needed to end feud. Milwaukee Journal 
Sentinel. Retrieved from 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1683&dat=20070322&id=3uIqAAAAI
BAJ&sjid=qkUEAAAAIBAJ&pg=4185,880126 
Mariano, R. (2006, February 23). Commuter rail in region will pay off. Milwaukee 
Journal Sentinel. Retrieved from 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1683&dat=20060223&id=CR8eAAAAI
BAJ&sjid=K44EAAAAIBAJ&pg=4806,1809368 
Marley, P. (2011, May 3). Budget committee votes to eliminate RTAs. Milwaukee 
Journal Sentinel. Retrieved from 
http://www.jsonline.com/blogs/news/121184349.html  
MARTA. (2004). History of MARTA - 1970-1979. Retrieved from 
http://web.archive.org/web/20050204222807/http://itsmarta.com/about/history02.
htm 
McIlheran, P. (2008, December 16). Magic costs more than mere rides. Milwaukee 
Journal Sentinel. Retrieved from 
http://www.jsonline.com/news/opinion/36263929.html 
McShane, C. (1994). Down the Asphalt Path: The Automobile and the American City. 
New York: Columbia University Press. 
Meligrana, J. (1999). Toward Regional Transportation Governance: A Case Study of 
Greater Vancouver. Transportation, 26: 359-380. 
Metra. (2012). Metra Passenger Operations. Retrieved from 
http://metrarail.com/content/dam/metra/documents/ridership_reports/Passgr%20O
ps%20v4%2020131014.pdf  
———. (2014). Frequently Asked Questions. Retrieved from 
http://metrarail.com/content/metra/en/home/utility_landing/riding_metra/faq.html
#q1 
78 
 
 
 
Middleton, W. D. (2003). Metropolitan Railways: Rapid Transit in America. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Murray, T. (2010, August 11). Rail Fail. Rouse Hill Times. Retrieved from 
https://ezproxy.lib.uwm.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?dir
ect=true&AuthType=ip,uid&db=n5h&AN=201008111001613613&site=ehost-
live&scope=site  
Myers, R. (2007, February 2). Your Opinions. Milwaukee Journal Sentinel. Retrieved 
from 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1683&dat=20070202&id=ueIqAAAAIB
AJ&sjid=rUUEAAAAIBAJ&pg=5008,595336 
O'Toole, R. (2007). The Best Laid Plans: How Government Planning Harms Your 
Quality of Life, Your Pocketbook, and Your Future. Washington, D.C.: Cato 
Institute. 
———. (2009). Gridlock: Why We're Stuck in Traffic and What to do About it. 
Washington, D.C: Cato Institute. 
Pantell, S. (2009). Tipping the Playing Field: How America's Federal Funding Policy 
Heavily Favors Roads Over Transit. Light Rail Now. Retrieved from 
http://www.lightrailnow.org/features/f_lrt_2009-05a.htm 
Peck, J. & Tickell, A. (2002). Neoliberalizing Space. Antipode, 34(3), 380-404. 
Perl, A. (2002). New Departures: Rethinking Rail Passenger Policy in the Twenty-First 
Century. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. 
Peterson, L. (2009, January 11). Commuter rail falters again as supplier fails. Tampa 
Tribune. Retrieved from 
https://ezproxy.lib.uwm.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?dir
ect=true&AuthType=ip,uid&db=n5h&AN=2W6806958174&site=ehost-
live&scope=site 
Potter, R. (2007, February 19). It's now or never for commuter rail. Biz Times Milwaukee. 
Retrieved from http://www.biztimes.com/article/20070219/BLOGS/302199990/ 
Racine Journal Times. (2010, April 4). Regional bus, rail transit vital for Racine's future. 
Racine Journal Times. Retrieved from 
http://journaltimes.com/news/opinion/commentary-regional-bus-rail-transit-vital-
for-racine-s-future/article_2020570e-4034-11df-95c1-001cc4c03286.html 
Racine Journal Times. (2011, May 8). Boneheaded move on transit. Racine Journal 
Times. Retrieved from http://journaltimes.com/news/opinion/editorial/editorial-
boneheaded-move-on-transit/article_859bcb94-79be-11e0-a78d-
001cc4c002e0.html 
79 
 
 
 
Railway Gazette International. (2013). Tram projects fail to take off. Railway Gazette 
International. Vol. 169, Iss. 3. Retrieved from 
https://ezproxy.lib.uwm.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?dir
ect=true&AuthType=ip,uid&db=buh&AN=86163738&site=ehost-
live&scope=site  
Resler, J. (2006, December 22). Want it? Gotta pay for it. Milwaukee Journal Sentinel. 
Retrieved from 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1683&dat=20061222&id=WToqAAAA
IBAJ&sjid=HkcEAAAAIBAJ&pg=2982,783230  
Rice, J. (2009, January 15). Presentation opposing KRM by Thomas Rubin. Bayview 
Compass. Retrieved from http://bayviewcompass.com/presentation-opposing-
krm-by-thomas-rubin/ 
Richmond, J. (2001). A Whole-System Approach to Evaluating Urban Transit 
Investments. Transport Reviews, 21 (2), 141-179. 
Rigney-Baxter, M. (2010, April 30). Fighting over the Kenosha-Racine-Milwaukee 
commuter line. Daily Reporter. Retrieved from 
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-21979885.html 
Rohde, M. (2010, December 20). Kenosha finds own route to rail station improvements. 
Daily Reporter. Retrieved from http://dailyreporter.com/2010/12/20/kenosha-
finds-own-route-to-rail-station-improvements/  
Ross, B. (2006). Stuck in Traffic: Free-Market Theory Meets the Highway Lobby. 
Dissent, 53 (3), 60-64.  
Rowen, J. (2013, December 29). Government, conservative media transit hostility keep 
SE WI employees from work. Milwaukee Journal Sentinel. Retrieved from 
http://www.jsonline.com/blogs/purple-wisconsin/237892901.html 
Rubin, T. A., Moore, J. E. II & Lee, S. (1999). Ten Myths about US Urban Rail System. 
Transport Policy, 6, 57-73. 
Rubin, T. A. & Poole, R, Jr. (2008). Kenosha-Racine-Milwaukee Corridor Transit 
Service Options: An Investigation and Analysis. Reason Foundation, Policy Study 
372. 
Ryan, S. (2005, August 3). Plan for Kenosha-Racine-Milwaukee Metra extension 
transitions from proposal to project. Daily Reporter. Retrieved from 
http://dailyreporter.com/2005/08/02/metra-plans-running-on-track/  
———. (2006, July 26). Commuter rail between Kenosha, Racine and Milwaukee will 
lead to development, study says. Daily Reporter. Retrieved from 
http://dailyreporter.com/2006/07/25/krm-will-lead-to-development-study-says/  
80 
 
 
 
———. (2007a, July 4). Milwaukee holds commuter rail trump card. Daily Reporter. 
Retrieved from http://dailyreporter.com/2007/07/04/milwaukee-holds-commuter-
rail-trump-card/  
———. (2007b, May 7). Ostby: KRM's critical piece of infrastructure. Daily Reporter. 
Retrieved from http://dailyreporter.com/2007/05/07/ostby-krm8217s-critical-
piece-of-infrastructure/ 
———. (2009a, June 23). Kenosha-Racine-Milwaukee Commuter Link tax stirs up mix 
of opposition in Wisconsin. Daily Reporter. Retrieved from 
http://dailyreporter.com/?s=Kenosha-Racine-
Milwaukee+Commuter+Link+tax+stirs+up+mix+of+opposition+in+Wisconsin 
———. (2009b, January 28). Kenosha-Racine-Milwaukee sales tax faces fresh 
opposition. Daily Reporter. Retrieved from 
http://dailyreporter.com/2009/01/28/krm-sales-tax-faces-fresh-opposition/  
———. (2009c, August 24). Chugging toward a solution for construction of the 
Kenosha-Racine-Milwaukee commuter link. Daily Reporter. Retrieved from 
http://dailyreporter.com/?s=Chugging+toward+a+solution+for+construction+of+t
he+Kenosha-Racine-Milwaukee+commuter+link 
———. (2010a, March 24). KRM debate in Wisconsin switches to development. Daily 
Reporter. Retrieved from http://dailyreporter.com/2010/03/24/krm-debate-
switches-to-development/ 
———. (2010b, April 22). Milwaukee transit bill dies in Wisconsin Senate. Daily 
Reporter. Retrieved from http://dailyreporter.com/2010/04/22/milwaukee-transit-
bill-dies-in-senate/ 
———. (2010c, June 17). Dispute over Kenosha-Racine-Milwaukee commuter rail 
threatens project engineering. Daily Reporter. Retrieved from 
http://dailyreporter.com/2010/06/17/commuter-rail-dispute-threatens-project-
engineering/  
———. (2010d, March 24). KRM [video file]. Retrieved from 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=dXQkH0gCA4A 
 Sandler, L. (2003, July 26). Commuter rail to Chicago weighed. Milwaukee Journal 
Sentinel. Retrieved from 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1683&dat=20030726&id=CagaAAAAI
BAJ&sjid=JkUEAAAAIBAJ&pg=5970,3048949 
———. (2004, December 22). Leaders to discuss extending Metra line. Milwaukee 
Journal Sentinel. Retrieved from 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1683&dat=20041222&id=ZroaAAAAI
BAJ&sjid=akUEAAAAIBAJ&pg=4674,1192533 
81 
 
 
 
———. (2006, November 24). New route for commuter rail. Milwaukee Journal 
Sentinel. Retrieved from 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1683&dat=20061124&id=TDAgAAAA
IBAJ&sjid=nUUEAAAAIBAJ&pg=6528,1968482 
———. (2007, November 29). City panel considers water, rail plans. Milwaukee Journal 
Sentinel. Retrieved from 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1683&dat=20071128&id=QuMqAAAA
IBAJ&sjid=vkUEAAAAIBAJ&pg=3029,4203512 
———. (2008, December 15). New study questions commuter rail line. Milwaukee 
Journal Sentinel. Retrieved from 
http://www.jsonline.com/news/wisconsin/36210564.html 
———. (2010a, August 2). RTA clings to Metra hopes for KRM. Milwaukee Journal 
Sentinel [blog]. Retrieved from 
http://www.jsonline.com/blogs/news/99767164.html 
———. (2010b, November 15). Other rail projects face new scrutiny. Milwaukee Journal 
Sentinel. Retrieved from 
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.lib.uwm.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/?sterms=P
UBLICATION%28Milwaukee+journal+sentinel%29&verb=sr&csi=299488 
———. (2010c, May 17). Transit authority will seek federal approval for KRM 
commuter rail line. Milwaukee Journal Sentinel. Retrieved from 
http://www.jsonline.com/news/milwaukee/93937474.html  
———. (2010d, May 21). Scott Walker says he opposed the KRM commuter rail line. 
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel. Retrieved from 
http://www.jsonline.com/news/milwaukee/94620064.html  
———. (2010e, May 30). Rail ideas await their fate in Milwaukee. Milwaukee Journal 
Sentinel. Retrieved from http://www.jsonline.com/news/wisconsin/95236479.html  
———. (2010f, August 26). Hold up KRM until bus needs addressed. Milwaukee 
Journal Sentinel. Retrieved from 
http://www.jsonline.com/news/milwaukee/101518284.html 
———. (2011, July 25). It's official: Rail line from Kenosha to Milwaukee is dead. 
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel. Retrieved from 
http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/126116213.html  
Sandler, L. & Marrero, D. (2010, June 18). Rental car bill threatens KRM rail funding. 
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel. Retrieved from 
http://www.jsonline.com/news/wisconsin/96701489.html 
Schwartz, T. M. & Hawkins, H. (2013). High Speed Rail in the USA: On Track or Not? 
International Journal of Technology, Policy and Management, 13(2), 153-169. 
82 
 
 
 
Smart Growth America. (2014). Take Advantage of Flexible Federal Transportation 
Funding. Retrieved from http://www.smartgrowthamerica.org/guides/smart-
growth-at-the-state-and-local-level/transportation/take-advantage-of-flexible-
federal-transportation-funding/ 
Southeastern Regional Transit Authority. (2010). KRM New Starts Application, p. 1-9. 
Retrieved from http://sewrpc.org/krmonline. 
Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Planning Commission. (1998). Feasibility Study of 
Commuter Railway Passenger Train Service in the Kenosha-Racine-Milwaukee 
Corridor. Community Assistance Planning Report No. 239. 
———. (2003). Kenosha-Racine-Milwaukee Corridor Transit Study Summary Report 
and Recommended Plan. Community Assistance Planning Report No. 276.  
———. (2007a). KRM Newsletter No. 3 - January 2007. Retrieved from 
http://maps.sewrpc.org/KRMonline/pdf/krm_nl-03.pdf 
———. (2007b). Reports. Current Project Phase -- Station Area Plans, TOD - Sections  
 A-I. Retrieved from http://maps.sewrpc.org/KRMonline/reports.shtm  
 
———. (2011a). Background. Kenosha-Racine-Milwaukee Commuter Link. Retrieved 
from http://maps.sewrpc.org/KRMonline/background.shtm 
———. (2011b). Purpose and Need. Kenosha-Racine-Milwaukee Commuter Link. 
Retrieved from http://maps.sewrpc.org/KRMonline/studypurpose.shtm 
Spieler, C. (2010). Are We Setting Up Commuter Rail to Fail? Cite: The Architecture 
and Design Review of Houston. Spring (81), 30-33. 
Steinkraus, D. (2011, February 5). Building a better Racine. Racine Journal Times. 
Retrieved from http://journaltimes.com/business/local/building-a-better-
racine/article_089c832a-3177-11e0-8c62-001cc4c03286.html 
Swartz, J. W. (2005, March 13). My View: New Mexico Commuter Rail is doomed to 
fail. Santa Fe New Mexican. Retrieved from 
https://ezproxy.lib.uwm.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?dir
ect=true&AuthType=ip,uid&db=n5h&AN=479222612&site=ehost-
live&scope=site 
Theodore, N., Peck, J., & Brenner, N. (2011). Neoliberal Urbanism: Cities and the Rule 
of Markets. In G. Bridge and S. Watson (eds.) The New Blackwell Companion to 
the City, 15-25. 
Thoreson, B. (2010, May 17). Transit board to seek approval for KRM. Racine Journal 
Times. Retrieved from http://journaltimes.com/news/local/transit-board-to-seek-
approval-for-krm/article_cb64a27e-6207-11df-b8d4-001cc4c03286.html 
83 
 
 
 
Transit NOW. (2012). Home Page. Kenosha-Racine-Milwaukee (KRM) Commuter Rail. 
Retrieved from http://www.transitnow.org/KRM.html 
———. (n.d.). Project Status. Kenosha-Racine-Milwaukee (KRM) Commuter Rail. 
Retrieved from http://www.transitnow.org/project-status.html 
Transportation Research Board. (2001). Making Transit Work: Insight from Western 
Europe, Canada, and the United States, Special Report No. 257. Washington, 
D.C.: National Academy Press. 
———. (2003). Transit Oriented Development. Traveler Response to Transportation 
System Changes. Transit Cooperative Research Program. Ch. 17.  
U.S. Department of Transportation. (2005). A Summary of Highway Provisions in 
SAFETEA-LU. Federal Highway Administration. Retrieved from 
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/safetealu/summary.htm 
Vos, R. (2010, April 10). Last-ditch RTA proposal unworkable, will cost taxpayers. 
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel. Retrieved from 
http://www.jsonline.com/news/opinion/90400244.html  
Walker, S. (2007, March 22). Rail plan won't help county bus system. Milwaukee Journal 
Sentinel. Retrieved from 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1683&dat=20070322&id=3uIqAAAAI
BAJ&sjid=qkUEAAAAIBAJ&pg=5449,880119 
Weir, M., Wolman, H., & Swanstrom, T. (2005). The Calculus of Coalitions: Cities, 
Suburbs, and the Metropolitan Agenda. Urban Affairs Review, 40 (6), 730-760.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
84 
 
 
 
Appendix 
Interview Questions: 
 
1. In your opinion, why did the KRM Commuter Rail project ultimately fail? 
2. [Depending on answer to Q1] It seems, at least on the surface, that the reason for 
KRM failing was largely politics. Do you feel this is accurate? Why/why not? 
3. [Depending on answer to Q1] In your opinion, why has Milwaukee struggled with 
funding for transit not only in the KRM project, but in other projects such as Light 
Rail? 
a. Was funding really the issue, or was this just the easiest way for opponents 
to reject the project. 
4. [Depending on answer to Q1] Do you feel that the expectations for KRM may 
have been too high, and that this is part of the reason for its failure? 
a. Were the economic development claims overstated? 
b. Was there also a feeling amongst transit advocates that this project was the 
last hope for a large-scale passenger rail project in the Milwaukee area?  
5. [Depending on answer to Q1] What was the impact of the previous light-rail 
debate on the KRM? 
a. Do you feel the light-rail debate influenced the decision to shift focus to 
Kenosha, Racine and Chicago for potential transit projects? 
b. Did the light rail debate set up KRM to fail? 
 
6. [Depending on answer to Q1] Do you feel there is a connection between the 
failure of transit projects in Milwaukee (and Wisconsin) and the auto-dominated 
culture that we live in? 
If so, to what extent? 
 
   
